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ABSTRACT 
UYGHUR (EASTERN TURKISTAN) SECESSONISM IN THE PEOPLE‘S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
 
Baek, Soohye 
 
MA., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar 
 
June 2008 
 
Since the 1990s, concerns about Uyghur secessionism have taken increasing 
world media and official attention. This new situation has been heightened since the 
incident of 9/11 with not only the presence of the U.S. in Central Asia but also 
attempt of Chinese government to link Uyghur secessionism to global terrorism. This 
thesis aims to examine the Uyghur secessionism, which continues from the times of 
the Qing Dynasty to the present day. The thesis provides historical background and 
the case studies of Barın and Gulca in 1990s on what led to contemporary tensions 
between the Uyghur and the PRC. After examining the historical underpinning of 
Eastern Turkistan conflict, it also attempts to analyze current state of the Uyghur 
secessionism as an international issue, particularly after the incident of 9/11.  
 
Keywords: Uyghur secessionism, Eastern Turkistan, People‘s Republic of China, 
9/11, Religious Radicalism, Cyber- secessionism, Terrorism. 
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Ö ZET 
 UYGUR (DOĞU TÜRKĠSTAN) AYRILIKÇILIĞI  
 
Baek, Soohye 
 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası ĠliĢkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar 
 
Haziran 2008 
 
1990‘lardan bu yana, Uygur ayrılıkçılığından kaynaklanan endiĢeler, dünya 
Basını ve resmi çevrelerin artan biçimde ilgisini çekti. Görece yeni olan söz konusu 
endiĢeler, 11 Eylül 2001 saldırılarından sonra, sadece ABD‘nin Orta Asya‘daki 
varlığı nedeniyle değil, aynı zamanda Çin hükümetlerinin, Uygur ayrılıkçılığını 
küresel terör ile bağdaĢtırma çabalarından dolayı da artıĢ gösterdi. Bu tez, Qing 
Hanedanı zamanlarından günümüze dek süregelen Uygur ayrılıkçılığını incelemeyi 
amaçlamaktadır. Tez, Ģu anda Uygurlar ve Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti arasındaki 
gerginliğin sebepleri olan 1990‘lardaki Barın ve Gulca olaylarının analizini ve tarihi 
arka planını içermektedir. Uluslararası bir mesele olarak Doğu Türkistan sorununun 
tarihi temellerini inceledikten sonra, bilhassa 11 Eylül olaylarından sonrası olmak 
üzere, Ģu anki Uygur ayrılıkçılığının durumunu da çözümlemeye çalıĢmaktadır. 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uygur ayrılıkçılığı, Doğu Türkistan, Ç in Halk Cumhuriyeti, 9/11, 
Dini radikalizm, Siber-ayrılıkçılık, Terorizm. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 Eastern Turkistan is situated in the northwest corner of the People‘s Republic 
of China (PRC). This territory covers 1.6 million square kilometers making up one-
sixth of Chinese landmass and borders eight countries: Mongolia, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Given its 
strategic location, Eastern Turkistan plays an important role as a gateway of the PRC 
to Central Asia. Moreover, this area is of enormous political, economic significance 
for the Chinese government, providing various natural resources supporting Chinese 
economic growth. Thus, the PRC remains strongly concerned over the region, 
restricting Uyghur cultural expression as well as the practice of Islam in Eastern 
Turkistan, prohibiting even peaceful expression of dissent from the Chinese policies, 
and in other ways continuing oppression that produces obvious disaffection among 
Uyghur and other non-Han ethnic group inside and outside. All these elements 
combine to make the result of secessionist struggle in Eastern Turkistan. 
 The proposition that in the feasible future, the strongest rivalry against the 
U.S., the only super-power in the international system, would be the China cannot be 
challenged easily. However, even if the increasing power of PRC in terms of 
 2 
economy and military upgrades her status in the international society, the political 
reformations in the domestic politics, especially the ethnic minority issues such as 
Tibet, Uyghur and so on has not been improved. The increasing resistence of 
minorities against the Chinese administration not only have made the international 
society be interested in the minority issue with the application of human right but 
also have weakened the Chinese argument that the interest of international society 
about minority issues is the interference of domestic affairs. 
Actually, since the 1990s, the Uyghurs who were the titular ethnic group have 
taken increasing attention of Western media for alleged involvement in ―terrorism.‖ 
Especially, after 9/11 in 2001, the Chinese government has strengthened its 
crackdown on Uyghur secessionist movement in Eastern Turkistan as an important 
security problem of international dimension. In other words, the U.S. launch of a 
global war on terror presented the PRC with an opportunity to change its strategy on 
Eastern Turkistan and possibly to gain wider international support for activities of 
Chinese government over the Uyghurs. Following such a situation, since 2002 there 
were numerous Chinese articles written related to the subjects of the global ―war on 
terror‖ and ―terrorism‖ in Eastern Turkistan and Central Asia, claiming that Uyghur 
secessionism in Eastern Turkistan is directly connected to Osama bin Laden‘s al-
Qaeda network and related movements in Afghanistan and the post-Soviet Central 
Asia.
1
  
According to a recent report, since 1990 Eastern Turkistan has witnessed over 
200 ―terrorist‖ attacks including assassinations, explosions, attacks on Chinese 
government institutions and police, establishment of secret training bases and 
plotting and organizing disturbances. These incidents have resulted in the death of 
                                                 
1
 Michael Clarke, ―China‘s Internal Security Dilemma and the ―Great Western Development‖: The 
Dynamics of Integration, Ethnic Nationalism and Terrorism in Xinjiang,‖ Asian Studies Review, Vol. 
31, (2007), p.338. 
 3 
162 and injury of 440 people respectively.
2
 In fact, what is occurring in Eastern 
Turkistan today is not new. Although the Uyghur population of Eastern Turkistan 
shares little in common with the Chinese not only historically but also culturally, 
Beijing has struggled to keep strict central government control over Eastern 
Turkistan since 1949.  
At this point, it is necessary to understand the importance of Eastern 
Turkistan on behalf of the PRC. The main reason of Chinese struggle lies in Eastern 
Turkistan‘s geographical location, which extends the PRC‘s reach to the borders of 
Central Asia, and simultaneously acts as a security buffer to the PRC. It also lies at 
the cultural crossroads between the Islamic world and the Han Chinese heartland. 
Moreover, from the economic point of view, Eastern Turkistan is a region of vast 
natural resources and agricultural potential. For example, Tarım Basin in Eastern 
Turkistan is reportedly one of the largest unexplored oil Basins of the world, with 
some estimates of potential reserves ranging as high as 147 billion barrels.
3
 It has 
been estimated that the PRC will need to import 21 million tons of oil by 2010, if it is 
to maintain its current economic growth rate.
4
 Thus, energy security is a major 
consideration in Chinese policy towards the region. Lastly, in the political aspect 
Eastern Turkistan provides the PRC with a unique potential to assert its influence in 
both Central Asia and the Middle East. The PRC‘s regional authority is strengthened 
by its position as a Central Asian power and Beijing regards the collapse of the 
Soviet Union as an opportunity to expand Chinese leadership in Central Asia.
5
  
                                                 
2
 ―East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,‖ Beijing Review, Vol. 45, Issue 5, 
(2002), pp.14-23. 
3
 Kathy Chen, ―Foreign Oil Companies Find Risks in Exploring China‘s Tarım Basin,‖ Wall Street 
Journal, (October 10, 1994), p. A1; Cited Mamdouh Salameh.1995-1996. ―China, Oil and the Risk of 
Regional Conflict,‖ Survival, Vol.37, Issue 4, (Winter 1995-1996), p.139. 
4
 Paul George, ―Islamic Unrest in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region,‖ Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service, Commentary No.73. (1997), p.2. 
5
 Lillian Craig Harris, ―Xinjiang, 1998Central Asia and the implications for China‘s policy in the 
Islamic World,‖ China Quarterly Vol.133, (1993), p.116. 
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Given this geographic and economic significance of Eastern Turkistan, 
Chinese control over the region is above all more important for its security concerns. 
Therefore, any kinds of discontent in Eastern Turkistan and demand for 
independence from the PRC have been a matter of great concern for the Chinese 
government for a long time. The PRC is also aware that a compliance with Uyghur 
demand will have a great influence on the secessionism of Tibet and Taiwan as 
domino effect. In all senses, Uyghur secessionism in Eastern Turkistan can lead to a 
dissolution and further insecurity of the PRC. This is the reason why Eastern 
Turkistan is regarded as an essential part of the PRC.  
The situation of the contemporary Uyghur secessionism in Eastern Turkistan 
under the rule of PRC should be understood in the historical context of the relations 
between Eastern Turkistan and the PRC.  In this respect, the main aim of this thesis 
is to inquire into Uyghur secessionism from the past phase to the current one through 
the continued conflictive relations of Uyghurs with the PRC. Through such a process, 
the fundamental causes that have led to the current secessionism in Eastern Turkistan 
will be also examined. Deep differences between the Chinese and Uygurs in terms of 
historical, cultural and religious aspects have served as the hidden and basic driving 
force to bring about the Uygur secessionism. In other words, traditional perception 
that the increasing secessionism of Uygurs has been affected by the religious 
radicalism cannot be applied into the case of Eastern Turkistan totally. In this context, 
examining the hidden factors to increase Uygur secessionism is inevitable to 
understand the origin of the Uyghur issue under the PRC rule. In order to conduct 
such process, this thesis utilizes the methodology of description by the chronological 
order based mostly on the English, Turkish and Korean books or articles, newspapers 
 5 
and internet sites, including original Uyghur sources translated into Turkish and 
English. 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Following the introduction, chapter 
two examines the historical background of contemporary Uyghur secessionism in 
Eastern Turkistan to give a brief knowledge on in what kind of context these 
conflicts have been continued today. In chapter three, incidents of Barın in 1990 and 
Gulca in 1997 will be examined as representative case studies among violent 
incidents in 1990s. This chapter allows us to understand concrete reality how the 
PRC and Eastern Turkistan came to be in conflict through two main violent incidents 
in Eastern Turkistan, connecting historical background with today‘s Uyghur 
secessionism. Chapter four explains contemporary Uyghur secessionism, particularly 
focusing on the period of post- 9/11 as a turning point in the history of Eastern 
Turkistan. This event transformed the Uyghur secessionism from the domestic 
problem to an international one mostly related to the human rights issues. In this 
chapter, another emphasis will be put on the concept of religious radicalism and the 
Eastern Turkistan Government in Exile (ETGE) in the context of Uyghur 
secessionism and cyber secessionism on the ground of technological era. This thesis 
is concluded with an in-depth analysis of main factors which have brought about 
Uyghur secessionism and how contemporary Uyghur secessionism is different from 
the past one in the flow of tensions between Eastern Turkistan and the PRC. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
Examining the historical background of Uyghur secessionism gives us an idea 
of what kinds of fundamental reasons have been laid before that led to the relation of 
conflict between the Uyghur and the Chinese. Therefore, in this chapter, the origin of 
tensions between the Uyghur and the Chinese that is divided into three eras as Qing, 
the Republic of China (ROC) and the PRC will be provided. Although the Ming 
Dynasty had produced a tribute system with Eastern Turkistan, real control over the 
region was started under the Qing (1759-1911).
6
 This is largely because the Qing 
Dynasty built the foundation of policies about the rule of Eastern Turkistan that 
continue until today and has a great influence on the Uyghur secessionism. The 
subsequent warlordism through Republican era to the PRC was even more significant 
to creating a motivation of Uyghurs for independence. Especially, this period was 
marked by a variety of violent incidents that often lead to ethnic conflict even until 
now. In this sense, the period from the Qing Dynasty to the establishment of the PRC 
will be examined in this chapter in order to understand the origin of the Uyghur 
secessionism within historical context.  
                                                 
6
 Michael Dillon, Xinjiang, China’s Muslim Far Northwest, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), p.17. 
 7 
2.1 Qing Era (1759 – 1911) 
The Manchus who established Qing Dynasty in China invaded the Uyghur 
Kingdom of Eastern Turkistan in 1759 and dominated it until 1862. Conquest by 
Manchu Qing Dynasty brought the territories known as Eastern Turkistan under the 
Qing rule. The Manchus are notable in that they were an ethnic minority in the 
empire that they ruled and it follows that they had an understanding of how to govern 
a multi-ethnic empire. During this period, starting with an unsuccessful uprising 
sparked by Manchu and Uyghur officials in Ü ç Turfan
7
 in 1765, Uyghur revolted 42 
times against the Qing rule for regaining their independence.
8
 Although these raids 
disrupted Qing rule in Khotan, Yarkand and KaĢgar, they could not prevent the Qing 
armies from reasserting control in Eastern Turkistan. A chaotic situation was 
continued with the Uyghur‘s controlling the south and west and Hui‘s9  (Chinese 
Muslims in China, or known as Dungan or Tungan in Central Asia) dominating the 
east and north. 
In 1864 both Hui and Uyghur people rebelled again in cities of Eastern 
Turkistan, following an on-going Chinese Muslim Rebellion in Gansu and Shaanxi 
provinces further east. As a result, in the last revolt the Uyghurs were successful in 
expelling the Manchus from their motherland. Yakub Beg (1820-1877, Khan 1864-
1877) who was a warlord of Kokand Khanate entered Eastern Turkistan via KaĢgar 
and dominated almost the entire area except Ġli valley territory by 1872.10 Affiliated 
                                                 
7
 For more information about Ü ç Turfan, see Ġklil Kurban, Doğu Türkistan İçin Savaş, (Ankara: Türk 
Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1995), p.74.  
8
 Mehmet Emin Buğra, Chinese Policy, (Ġstanbul: Ġstanbul, 1954), p.25.  
9
 For more information, see Dru C. Gladney, Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities and Other 
Subaltern Subjects, (London: Hurst &Company Ltd., 2005), p.120 and Ġsa Yusuf Alptekin, Esir Doğu 
Türkistan için: Ġsa Yusuf Alptekin‘in mücadele hatıraları, (Ġstanbul: Doğu Türkistan NeĢriyat Merkezi, 
1985), p.291. 
10
 Ġli was under the control of Russia that took advantages on this chaotic. However, in 1881, Russia 
was forced by international diplomatic and Qing military oppression to return to the Qing most of Ġli 
territory it had annexed. See Mehmet Saray, Doğu Türkistan Tarihi, (Ġstanbul: Cağaloğlu Kitabevi, 
1997), p.223. 
 8 
with Hui, Yakub Beg established KaĢgar Khanate (1864-1877) and set Aksu as 
capital city.
11
 Yakub Beg and his kingdom were of a great significance in the history 
of Uyghur secessionism because they served as national symbols that Uyghurs can 
gather around. 
There are several factors beyond Qing control that led to the collapse of 
Qing rule in Eastern Turkistan. First, at the time of Qing conquest, sufism had helped 
to Uyghurs to survive. This played an important role as a unifying element for the 
various ethnic groups of Eastern Turkistan under the Qing rule.
12
 Also, at the time 
that the Qing lost Eastern Turkistan, the empire was experiencing a period of 
significant weakness by the Opium War (1839-1842), and the Taiping (1851-1864) 
and Nian (1851-1868) rebellions in the following years. In fact, when the region was 
lost, there were serious debates on whether or not it was worthwhile to re-conquest 
it.
13
 The rebellion in the northwestern Chinese provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu that 
broke out among Hui in 1862 also seriously undermined the ability of the Qing to 
rule Eastern Turkistan.
14
 All these factors resulted in a financial crisis by burden of 
tax and encouraged corruption at the regional level.
15
 Regional corruption by 
selected local officials was main reason for tensions between the central Chinese 
government and the locals of Eastern Turkistan, even today. 
The kingdom of Yakub Beg had several important characteristics. Although 
entirely the Yakub Beg kingdom did not fit with Uyghur claims for a national 
identity, it helped to shape it effectively. The rebellion in the later stages had a 
distinct Turkic flavor to it by virtue of the intervention of Yakub Beg, despite of Hui 
                                                 
11
 A. N., Korupatkin, Kashgaria, trans, Walter E. Gowan, (Calcutta: Thacker Spink, 1882), p.277. 
12
 Michael Dillon,. China’s Muslims, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.23. 
13
 Kim Hodong, Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia,1864-
1877, (California, Stanford University Press, 2004), p.163. 
14
 Mehmet Saray, pp.182-183. 
15
 Kim, p.33. 
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involvement. Furthermore, religion was an important component in this period. The 
significant point of Yakub Beg was that he was idolized as a ghazi (holy warrior).
16
 
The manipulation of religious titles and the enforcement of shariah were also 
important aspects of Yakub Beg‘s kingdom. As the people of Eastern Turkistan were 
overwhelmingly Muslim, Islam became a standard banner for leaders to encourage 
unity. This is how in Eastern Turkistan an Islamic regime was established by Yakub 
Beg. By virtue of commercial treaties with Tsarist Russia and Great Britain, the 
kingdom of Yakub Beg was recognized by the Ottoman Empire as well as the Tsarist 
Russia and Great Britain.
17
 The relations with the Ottoman Empire played a 
significant role in strengthening Pan-Turkic nationalism in Eastern Turkistan.
18
  
However, the ability of Yakub Beg to govern this region have had various 
limitations. The main problem was related to the economy. The rebellion had 
drastically reduced the population and handicapped the economy. For example, the 
barter system, among policies of Yakub Beg, worked as a dangerous factor for the 
economic stability and there was a massive loss of tax revenue due to the corruption 
of Kokand officials who were appointed to the high positions in the local 
governments.
19
 Yakub Beg also exacerbated the people by managing inner security 
through a blood and iron policy, and an oppression that was similar to the severe 
aspects of Qing rule.
20
 Although he had strong cultural ties to the people of Eastern 
Turkistan, Yakub Beg was not able to gather a grassroots support. Furthermore, as an 
external factor for the collapse of Yakub Beg‘s kingdom, Great Britain persuaded the 
                                                 
16
 Saadettin Gömeç, Uyghur Türkleri Tarihi ve Kültürü, (Ankara: Atatürk Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk 
Kültür Merkezi BaĢlanlığı, 1997), p.71. 
17
 Ġsa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davası, (Ġstanbul: Marifet, 1973), pp. 127- 128. 
18
 Kim, p.117. 
19
 Kim, p.133. 
20
 Kim, p.129.  
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Manchu court to conquer Eastern Turkistan for the fear of Tsarist expansion into 
Eastern Turkistan. The Manchu invasion was financed mainly by the British Bank.
21
  
In 1875, the Manchu court sent their general, Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885, 
Viceroy of Lianjiang 1881-1884), to take over the rule in the region. Although, Qing 
armies fought fiercely with mainly Hui forces in the Turfan-Urumçi-Manas area, 
they faced little opposition from them because of Yakub Beg‘s death.22 As a result, 
Zuo Zongtang officially proclaimed that Eastern Turkistan was dominated by the 
Qing Dynasty on May 16, 1878.
23
 After the collapse of the Yakub Beg regime, Zuo‘s 
force could not only regain the Tarım Basin with little resistance from Uyghur, but 
also pressure the Russian power to withdraw.
24
 In order to keep stability in the region 
later, the Qing attempted to isolate Eastern Turkistan from the problems of China 
proper. This was a relatively successful policy approach as indicated by the ability 
for able Han bureaucrats presided over a peaceful Eastern Turkistan after the 
collapse of Yakub Beg‘s kingdom.25 This policy was maintained in the region in the 
sphere of Qing influence for the remainder of the Qing‘s existence until its collapse 
in 1911.  
Finally, in 1884, the Qing established Xinjiang (New frontier) as a province, 
formally taking it under the political system of China proper.
26
 Governments of cities 
in Eastern Turkistan were established following the Chinese way and administration. 
                                                 
21
 Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian frontiers of China and Russia, (New 
York: AMS Press, 1950), p.32. 
22
 Saray, p.195. 
23
 Kurban, p.85. 
24
 James Millward and Nabijan Tursun, ―Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884—1978,‖ in 
Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, S. Frederick Starr, ed. (New York: Central Asia Caucasus 
Institute, 2004), p.62. 
25
 Andrew D.W Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of 
Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.10. 
26
 Anwar Rahman, Sinicization Beyond the Great Wall: China‘s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, 
(UK: Matador, 2005), p.22.   
 11 
About thirty years from the formation of Xinjiang province in Eastern Turkistan to 
the collapse of Qing Dynasty, this area was comparatively stable. 
 
2.2 Republic of China (ROC, 1911 - 1949) 
The Republican era played an important role in the early formation of 
current Uyghur secessionism. It was in this period that Uyghurs in Eastern Turkistan 
underwent national ethnic awakening. This is largely because various legacies of 
discrimination over Uyghurs that has been lasted to today began to re-emerge 
strongly under the Republican rule. For example, contrary to the policy of the Qing 
era, republican officials encouraged Han immigration and then provided them even 
with farmland. This region was governed by Han Chinese at the provincial and 
several sub-provincial levels, giving them the authority to allocate land to the newly 
arrived Han.
27
 The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
28
 (XPCC) also 
repeated this process under the later communist rule. 
At this point, to examine overall national minority policies throughout the 
Republican era can be helpful to understand contemporary Uyghur conflict with Han 
Chinese. First of all, Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925, President of the ROC January 1, 1912-
April 1, 1912, Premier of the GMD 1919-1925), who was a Han nationalist, 
supported autonomy for the minorities within limits of self-determination.
29
 
Meanwhile, in the case of Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975, Director-General of the 
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GMD 1938-1975, President of the ROC (i.e. Taiwan) 1948-1975), his main political 
ideology was guided by a Han centric point of view.
30
 In other words, Chiang Kai-
shek believed that all minorities in Eastern Turkistan were branches of the Han 
ethnicity, following the concept of a Greater Han Brotherhood that means that the 
greater Han are the big brothers of all other nationalities in China.
31
 Although 
various warlords such as Sun Yat-sen tried to prevent from practically applying the 
concept, this became a legacy in the central government of China, fueling Han 
chauvinism.  
Following the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, the first warlord
32
 to govern 
Eastern Turkistan was Yang Zengxin (1859-1928, Governor of Eastern Turkistan 
1911-1928) who was the former administrator of this region during the last years of 
the Qing rule. His policies were detrimental to ethnic relations over Eastern 
Turkistan and ultimately contributed to the revolt and ethnic awakening of Uyghur 
that led to establishment of the Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan 
(TIRET 1933-1934). Although Yang kept the Beg system that was a feudal land 
owning administration system of the Qing era, the Beg system under his rule had a 
tendency of direct role in ruling the province. As Yang distrusted the native peoples 
of Eastern Turkistan, he appointed officials from his home province of Yunnan.
33
 
Throughout his rule, Yang carried out a system of political repression and developed 
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a political feature of terror.
34
 Moreover, he prohibited the publication of newspapers, 
strictly controlling the flow of information. Forbes explains Yang‘s brutal policies as 
an attempt to isolate, divide, and maintain in enforced ignorance in the peoples of 
Eastern Turkistan.
35
  
Ultimately, these policies deeply influenced the Uyghur identity during his 
reign. Under the strict official information control, two competing schools of thought 
developed among the Uyghurs: the secular nationalist movement modeled after the 
Central Asian Jadids
36
 and a conservative religious movement espoused by the Amirs 
(commander or general) of Khotan.
37
 The division of the two ideologies also 
underlines contemporary splits between secular nationalists and those who identify 
themselves rather with religion. At the same time, there was a heightened secular 
Pan-Turkic ideology that was stemming from Central Asia by the Jadid movement. 
This started to spread in Eastern Turkistan through the Central Asia ruled by Tsarist 
Russia before the revolution. In other words, the growth of Russian power inside and 
outside Eastern Turkistan worked as the major carrier of the Turkic nationalist 
ideologies for Uyghur secessionism from early on. 
The successor of Yang-Zengxin was Jin Shuren (1883-1941, Governor of 
Eastern Turkistan 1928-1933). Overall his policies were disastrous, resulting in not 
only wide spread nepotism but also political corruption. Jin was also responsible for 
the annexation of the Kumul Khanate
38
 as well as the pushing down the Kumul 
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rebellion
39
 in 1931 by virtue of the decision to permit Han settlement in Uyghur 
land.
40
 The Kumul rebellion was unique on the ground that it did not claim full 
secession, but rather wished for extended autonomy with the replacement of Jin as 
governor of the province.
41
 This rebellion provided the pretext for the invasion of Ma 
Chung-ying
42
 (1911- ? , Hui warlord of the Gansu province in China during the 
1930s) who was a Hui (Chinese Muslim)
43
 warlord. Moreover, he was one of 
members from the Ma warlord clique
44
 whose severe warlord warfare in Eastern 
Turkistan created an anti-Hui feeling.  
Under the Jin‘s command, the provincial authorities tried to oppress the 
Kumul rebellion. The rebellion came under the leadership of two former ministers of 
the khanate, Hoca Niyaz (? -1937) and Yulbars Khan (1888- ?). In an attempt to the 
military balance among the provincial forces, Yulbars travelled east to seek help 
from the nationalist government in Nanjing.
45
 However, in the event he called upon 
the services of Ma Chung-ying who was a youthful, intelligent, charismatic warlord, 
admired by his Hui troops. Ma Chung-ying acted independently as a warlord, 
without an official Guomindang (GMD, Chinese Nationalist Party) sanction for this 
intervention. His intervention had a serious influence on Eastern Turkistan and 
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Uyghurs. One of the most important effects was that this intervention led to a sharp 
distinction in terms of interests between Hui Muslims and the native Turkic Muslims. 
 This factor strengthened ethnic character in Uyghur identity, reducing the 
importance of Islam in Uyghur ideology for secessionism. Although Ma Chung-ying 
was repelled from the Kumul region, he returned. As Ma Chung-ying was also cruel 
and brutal, and his troops were known for their reputation as brigands and murderers, 
his activities resulted in giving the revolt an anti-Hui flavor.
46
 
At the same time, Sheng Shicai (1897-1970, Governor of Eastern Turkistan 
1933-1944) entered the region by the request of Jin. During Kumul rebellion and 
invasion of Ma Chung-ying, Sheng‘s position was to oppose the Ma‘s army.47 Under 
the condition of brutal suppression by the provincial authorities, failure of their co-
religionists to assist them, and even a series of attacks from their co-religionists, the 
Uyghurs went through distinct suffering at the hands of the Han Chinese. That is why 
following rebellion came about in the Tarım Basin soon.  
 
2.2.1. Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan (TIRET, 1933-1934) 
The Tarım Basin rebellion in the southern province of Eastern Turkistan was 
an entirely different rebellion from the others. In the beginning of 1933, a 
secessionist revolt planned under the leadership of Muhammad Emin Buğra (1901-
1965) and his two brothers emerged in Tarım Basin. 48  These brothers styled 
themselves as ―Amirs‖ of the new state, declaring independence of the Khotan 
Emirate on March 16, 1933.
49
 At that time, although he was a member of the Islamic 
ulama and teacher of a madrasa in Karasar, Buğra also supported ‗Jadidist 
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Movement.‘ The Khotan Emirate sent one of the three brothers, ġahmansur Emin 
Buğra
50
 and a former publisher named Sabit Damolla to KaĢgar, where they 
established the KaĢgar Affairs Office of the Khotan Government in July of 1933. In 
September, the Khotan Emirate‘s KaĢgar Affairs Office had changed into the Eastern 
Turkistan Independence Association, which drew on ideas of reforms, nationalism 
and Jadidism.
51
 After all, Sabit Damolla declared the establishment of the Turkish-
Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan (TIRET) with Hoca Niyaz as its president who 
was the former vizier of the Kumul Khan and then allied with Sheng-Shicai who was 
Governor of Eastern Turkistan from 1933 to 1944.
52
 The TIRET claimed authority 
over territory ranging from Aksu along the northern rim of the Tarım Basin to 
Khotan in the south.  
However, TIRET faced with some limits. In fact, TIRET went through rapid 
inflation and surrounded by hostile powers including the Hui forces. Furthermore, 
Shinmen Yasushi argues that this Republic was founded not only on Islam but also 
on the modernizing, nationalistic ideals of the Jadidist movement of the 1910s and 
1920s.
53
 This ambiguous factor is included in confusion over the names used for the 
new state; although some primary sources refer to this state as the ‗Turkish-Islamic 
Republic of Eastern Turkistan,‘ in other sources, including the constitution itself, it is 
simply called ‗Eastern Turkistan Republic.‘ 54  There was also ethno-nationalistic 
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ambiguity in the first coins of the new government under the name of ‗Republic of 
Uyghurstan‘ (Uyghurstan Cumhuriyeti). However, later passports as well as coins 
were labeled ‗Eastern Turkistan Republic.‘55 
Another limitation of TIRET was the fact that this new government was 
failed to take international recognition despite of dispatching the numerous envoys 
such as Prime-Minister Sabit Damolla to USSR, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and 
British India. Especially, Soviet Union rejected all offers of dealing with ―Islamists‖ 
and therefore, actively opposed this independent ―Islamic Republic.‖56 In the same 
way, other countries also refused to deal with envoys as representatives of 
independent Republic. This is largely because no one would have liked to make a 
challenge to the powerful Soviet Union and the ROC in their political relations and 
engage in fighting in Eastern Turkistan. As a result, TIRET was surrounded by 
hostile powers, Huis, Soviet Union, and the ROC.
57 
Although its life was short, TIRET had a lasting effect on the Uyghur 
national identity. First, it was the first independent state in Eastern Turkistan that was 
founded under the native Uyghur leadership in the 20
th
 century. Moreover, its 
domestic policies were based on a rather Islamic sharia system, but with an 
important addition of certain social, educational and economic reforms.
58
 Although 
there were major differences between kingdom of Yakub Beg (1864-1877) and 
TIRET, these states played a significant role in providing national historical 
consciousness of Uyghur with motivations for independence from the Chinese rule. 
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Meanwhile, Jin became reliant on the Soviet Union and fully engaged in the 
war with Ma Chung-ying for the rule of Eastern Turkistan.
59
 In the course of the war, 
Ma Chung-ying who previously had claimed to enter Eastern Turkistan to help the 
Turkic peoples in the Jin‘s sphere, attacked TIRET and after all destroyed it. That is, 
ultimately TIRET met its fate not by the Nationalist forces of ROC but by its fellow, 
Muslim warlords, resulting in the historical break between the Huis and the 
Uyghurs.
60
 
 
2.2.2. Eastern Turkistan Republic (ETR, 1944-1949)  
In the campaign against Ma‘s forces, Sheng‘s continued successes damaged 
authority of Jin in the region and as a result Jin was ousted by a coup.
61
 The Soviets 
supported Sheng Shicai, who was officially recognized as governor by the nationalist 
government of ROC in 1933.
62
 He defeated warlord Ma Chung-ying, removing him 
as a major player in Eastern Turkistan from that time on.
63
 The policies of Sheng 
were particularly brutal and eventually rebellions were ended up with the creation of 
Eastern Turkistan Republic (ETR). It was Sheng‘s harsh rule that make the Uyghurs 
perceive the Han regime as their cultural enemy. By his close relations with the 
USSR, Eastern Turkistan was basically a Soviet satellite from 1937 to 1944.
64
 
Furthermore, under the effect of Stalinism in Eastern Turkistan, Sheng‘s various 
purges including Hoca Niyaz who was accused of spying for the Japanese also had 
an influence on alienating the Turkic communities in Eastern Turkistan.
65
 Estimates 
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of those killed in the purges of Sheng ranged from 50,000 to 100,000 during his 
career.
66
  
During WWII, the situation of Eastern Turkistan was very sensitive about 
shifts in the international strategic alignments between world powers. As Hitler 
invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941, the U.S. began to support the GMD. 
Sheng decided to cut off relations with the Soviet Union. First, he tried to kick out 
Soviet personnel and even executed his Chinese Communist advisers such as Mao 
Zemin (1896-1943). 
67
 As a result, Sheng became Chairman of the GMD Xinjiang 
party branch and welcomed Nationalist troops as well as the opening of a U.S. 
consulate in Urumçi. However, Sheng once again attempted to seek the patronage of 
the Soviet Union because of the failure of the German army to take Stalingrad in 
1943. Therefore, he arrested the representatives of GMD in Eastern Turkistan, 
writing to Stalin that they were spies of Japan and telling Chiang Kai-shek they were 
Communists.
68
 This time Stalin refused the request of Sheng and passed his letter to 
Chiang.
69
 Finally, Sheng was forced to return to the Nationalist government, which 
led to his removal from Eastern Turkistan in September 1944.
70
 
Meanwhile, fiscal and economic policies of GMD government played a 
negative role in Eastern Turkistan. After Sheng‘s fall, GMD governors imposed an 
exchange rate that benefited mainly Han Chinese, strengthening aspects of economic 
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discrimination in the policy and practice that continues even today.
71
 Furthermore, 
Chiang Kai-shek began the ―Northwest Development‘ policy in 1942.72 The main 
goal of this policy was to encourage Han immigration to the Eastern Turkistan in 
order to change demographic system and eventually integrate this region into the 
Republic of China (ROC).
73
 This policy continued in the Communist period with 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), resulting in the main source of 
current tensions between the Uyghur and Chinese government. In this period, 
nomadic Kazaks, who were already in revolt against Sheng because of his policies, 
especially for the closure of the Soviet border, also found little improvement under 
the GMD government.
74
 Accordingly, some Kazak guerillas under the leadership of 
Osman Batur (1899-1951)
75
 made sporadic raids on Chinese settlements and 
government.
76
 Likewise, by 1944 when Sheng left Eastern Turkistan, a revolt was 
already spreading into Ġli valley.  
 In October 1944, a revolt broke out in Nilka located in the south of Gulca.
77
 
This was the beginning of the ―Three Districts Revolution‖ named after the Ġli, Altay 
and Tarbagatay districts of northern Eastern Turkistan. Although Chiang Kai-shek 
ordered massacre as a step to put down these revolts in the northern region of Eastern 
Turkistan, gathering supporters not only from Eastern Turkistan exiles but also 
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Soviet Union, rebels took Gulca by November.
78
 As a result, the independence of the 
Eastern Turkistan Republic (ETR) was declared on 12 November 1944.
79
 The 
President was Alihan Töre
80
 (1885-1976, President of ETR 1944-1946) who was an 
Islamic scholar and cabinet members were consisted of the representatives from each 
ethnic group in Eastern Turkistan. With the support of Soviets, Eastern Turkistan 
Army took over Ġli, Tarbagatay and Altay districts. 81  However, the secret pact 
between GMD and Soviet Union allowed China to govern Eastern Turkistan in 
exchange of Mongolian People‘s Republic and Soviets‘ taking privileges from 
Manchuria.
82
 In consequence, although the representatives of Eastern Turkistan 
insisted on complete independence from China, the ETR became high autonomy [a 
de facto independence] in the autumn of 1945.
83
 
With the mediation of Soviet Union, on October 14, 1945 the ETR and 
GMD entered into an arrangement to govern Eastern Turkistan after the signing of 
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance on August 14, 1945.
84
 This ended 
Soviet support for the ETR. Although the negotiations between the GMD and ETR 
took months, the agreement was eventually concluded on July 1946 and as a result, 
Eastern Turkistan coalition government consisted of both GMD and Eastern 
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Turkistan members was approved.
85
 In this period, as a Chinese provincial Chairman, 
the role of Zhang Zhizhong (1896-1965) who was formerly the Commander of the 
North-western Military Headquarters in Lanzhou
86
 is significant in the modern 
history of Eastern Turkistan, as he recognized not only that most people of Eastern 
Turkistan were not Han Chinese, but also that rhetorical assertions to the contrary 
would not help.
87
  In the negotiations to create a coalition government, Zhang‘s main 
opposite person was Ahmetcan Kasimî (1914-1949, President of ETR 1946-1949) 
who was a Soviet-educated Uyghur originally from the Ġli Valley and had spent some 
time in Sheng‘s prisons. Although the most significant early leaders of the anti-
Chinese revolt in the Ġli Valley were conservative figures such as Alihan Töre, there 
were tendencies to shift to more secular and pro-Soviet ones by 1945 including 
Ahmetcan Kasimî. In the coalition government, Zhang Zhizhong would be Chairman 
and Ahmetcan Kasimî Vice-Chairman of the New Xinjiang provincial government.  
However, there were little changes and high conflicts in the coalition 
government. As a result, this government soon parted and the ETR cabinet members 
went back to Ġli to form ‗Union for the Defense of Peace and Democracy.‘ 88 
Accordingly, the ETR declared again autonomy in 1947 and it was remained a de 
facto separate pro-Soviet state with its own military forces and currency. Political 
activities of ETR were limited to the ‗Union for the Defense of Peace and 
Democracy,‘ a party on the Leninist one-party model.89  In 1949, when People‘s 
Liberation Army (PLA) that was victorious in the Chinese Civil war was reaching 
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Eastern Turkistan, autonomous government in Ġli decided to have a conference with 
Chinese Communist Party by a mediation of Soviet Union.
90
 Uyghur political leaders 
departed to attend the conference in Beijing, however, on the way, they disappeared 
under a mysterious plane crash over the Soviet border. They were all considered 
dead, including Alihan Töre.
91
 In the end, the PRC‘s occupation of Eastern Turkistan 
was started by GMD‘s surrender in the south and a deal struck with the Soviet Union 
in the north, together with the elimination of the ETR leadership in 1949. 
The ETR has several significant characteristics that make it essential to both 
Uyghur intellectuals and nationalists today. First, it incorporated Jadidist ideologies 
into national character. Despite its deep connections with the USSR, ETR was 
declared as an Islamic state with a list of 14 priorities.
92
 These priorities can be 
explained to a large extent as a list of concrete grievances that the Uyghur people in 
the ETR had against Chinese government. The ETR distinctly maintained an anti-
Han factor among them. Moreover, religion played an important role as unifying 
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 Benson lists 14 priorities as follow 
1. End Chinese rule. 
2. Establish equality for all nationalities 
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portionate to their population. 
4. Place local government in local hands. 
5. Promote free cultural development in all groups and the use of local languages. 
6. Re-establish locally manned military units. 
7. Abolish Sheng Shicai‘s prison system. 
8. Free all those arrested under Sheng. 
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10. Reduce taxation. 
11. Establish religious freedom. 
12. Oppose Han migration in East Turkistan. 
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element between the different peoples of Eastern Turkistan.
93
 Although ethnicity is a 
key point to Uyghur secessionism, Islam was also a major marker as a cultural shield 
to assimilation into the Han Chinese.  
 
2.3 People’s Republic of China (PRC 1949 – 1989) 
After PLA occupied Eastern Turkistan in late 1949, Uyghurs, especially in 
the southern Tarım Basin, occasionally resisted to the efforts of Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) to consolidate its rule and develop its policies. According to a Chinese 
source, there were 194 cases of counterrevolutionary secessionist activities and 19 
revolts in Eastern Turkistan between 1951 and 1981.
94
 Although there were such 
oppositions, the PRC succeeded in bringing the Islamic establishment under its rule 
while reforming land tenure, dispossessing powerful Uyghur landholders and 
redistributing lands once held as shrine and mosque endowments. This success was 
partly due to a relatively liberal policy related to the cultural expression and the 
whole religious life at the beginning of the PRC.
95
  
In fact, during the 1950s, the minority nationality policies of PRC in Eastern 
Turkistan were in the culturally pluralistic way. Especially, the policies of Chinese 
government from 1949 to 1956 were tempered and the CCP was afraid of pursuing 
strong anti-Islam policies, fearing that it can lead to higher conflict between the Han 
Chinese and the Uyghur, and further aggravate the widespread anti Han sentiments.
96
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McMillan explains the reasons for these careful policies of the Communist Chinese 
in Eastern Turkistan as follows: 
 
1. The existence of strong traditional tendencies among the local natio
nalities toward autonomy and even separation. 
2. The presence of distinct cultures, languages, and religions in the  
primarily non-Han area. 
3. The endurance of a Moscow-oriented communist movement and S-
oviet influence in the area. 
4. The continued resistance by counterrevolutionary and bandit elem-
ents in much of Eastern Turkistan. 
5. The great distances within the province and between Eastern Turki-
stan and China proper, which were amplified by the inadequate na-
ture of the existing transportation and communications network.
97
 
  
However, following the Sino-Soviet split, under the Great Leap Forward
98
 
(1958-61), the radical collectivization and industrialization trends were accompanied 
by a more cultural offense for assimilation, increase of Han immigration and 
settlement in Eastern Turkistan. Moreover, political attacks on the people of Eastern 
Turkistan associated with the former ETR and Soviet Union. As a result, although 
smaller population of Eastern Turkistan shielded it from hunger, the famine caused 
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by the Great Leap Forward as well as above elements resulted in an exodus of some 
500,000 Eastern Turkistanis to the Soviet Union in 1959 alone.
99
  
 There were continuous conflicts on the Eastern Turkistan border from the late 
1960s through the early 1970s. Following the Cultural Revolution
100
 (1965-76), the 
disruptive condition was continued to the Deng Xiaoping
101
 (1904-1997, General 
Secretary of the CCP 1956-1966, Chairman of the Central Military Commission of 
CCP 1981-1989) era. Serious discontents were also existed among Han youths 
Eastern Turkistan. In 1979, some 8,000 Han youth who had been dispatched from 
Shanghai and other urban centers to Eastern Turkistan in the previous decade 
demonstrated in Aksu. They requested better jobs, improved living conditions and 
educational opportunities in the region. In that time, they occupied both party and 
government offices for 40 days and 1,000 of them even staged a hunger strike.
102
 
This was one of the most significant demonstrations in Eastern Turkistan‘s modern 
history.  
Moreover, in this period as the most serious secessionist activity since 1949, 
the Soviet supported the Eastern Turkistan People‘s Party (ETPP) 103 managed to 
establish 178 branch offices in Eastern Turkistan and recruited more than 60,000 
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members.
104
 Although it is difficult to verify these numbers, the ETPP is probably 
the largest secret organization ever created since the invasion of Eastern Turkistan. 
Allegedly, the group tried to seek to establish an independent ETR that was secular, 
communist, and pro-Soviet in orientation.
105
 According to a Chinese source, the 
ETPP sent their delegations to Soviet Union and Mongolian People‘s Republic to ask 
for arms and the use of radio stations for their secessionist movement on several 
occasions.
106
  The ETPP focused not only on mobilizing Turkic-speaking populations 
in Eastern Turkistan with the purpose of preparation for a mass insurrection against 
Chinese government but also on guerrilla activities that include various attempts at 
insurrection during the 1960s and the 1970s.
107
 Even in recent years, some of the old 
ETPP members began the ethnic secessionist movement again.
108
 
 Following the rise of Deng Xiaoping, Eastern Turkistan became generally 
more stable than during the reign of Mao Zedong
109
 (1893-1976, 1
st
 Chairman of the 
PRC 1954-1959, Chairman of the CCP 1945-1976) that were full of political 
campaigns. Various reforms in the nationality policies by Hu Yaobang (1915-1989, 
Chairman of the CCP 1981-1982, General Secretary of the CCP 1980-1987) led to 
the relaxation of assimilation aspect regard to Eastern Turkistan and comeback of 
non-Han cadres who had been purged during the Great Leap and Cultural Revolution 
years to the party and government. Despite of such atmosphere of relaxation in 
Chinese policy, however, the 1980s was also a period of new demands. Uyghur 
people wanted greater political autonomy and jobs. These calls resulted in new 
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impositions and surveillance from the Chinese authorities.
110
 In this period, there was 
an influx of student demonstrations in Eastern Turkistan.  
For example, in December 1985, about 2,000 Uyghur students from seven 
universities and colleges including Xinjiang University demonstrated in Urumçi 
under the various slogans against mainly nuclear testing at Lop Nor,
111
 private 
immigration of Han Chinese and extension of the PRC‘s family planning policy to 
minorities in Eastern Turkistan.
112
 They were openly against the Chinese 
government‘s political decision related to Uyghurs and the Xinjiang University 
played a role as the headquarters of demonstrations. At that time, various posters 
with contents such as ―Chinese out of Eastern Turkistan,‖ ―independence for Eastern 
Turkistan‖ and ―cut off the railroad from China proper to Eastern Turkistan‖ were 
seen in Urumçi.
113
 The demonstration reflected Uyghur‘s fears that the Chinese 
government would make them a minority in their own autonomous region by 
permitting the influx of Han Chinese from China proper and limiting the Uyghur 
birthrate.   
Indeed, as Table 1 indicates, during the PRC period between 1949 and 2000, 
the number of Han settlers to Eastern Turkistan has been increased from 291,000 to 
7,250,000. Accordingly, by virtue of not only Han Chinese-centered policies but also 
increase of the Han Chinese population growth rate, conflicts between Uyghur and 
Han Chinese were inevitable in Eastern Turkistan.   
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 Table 1: Demographic strength of the main Eastern Turkistan nationalities 
 
Total Population 
(thousand) 
Uyghrus Han Kazakhs Hui 
1949 4,330 
3,291  
(75%) 
291  
(6.7%) 
443  
(10.2%) 
122  
(2.8%) 
1964 7,440 
4,020  
(54%) 
2,440  
(32.8%) 
501  
(6.7%) 
271  
(3.6%) 
1982 13,082 
5,950  
(45.4%) 
5,287  
(40.4%) 
904  
(6.9%) 
571  
(4.3%) 
1990 15,291 
7,249  
(47.4%) 
5,746  
(37.5%) 
1,161 
 (7.4%) 
688  
(4.5%) 
2000 18,494 
8,523  
(46%) 
7,250  
(39.2%) 
1,318 
 (7.1%) 
844  
(4.5%) 
Source: Fenjin de sishi nian: 1949-1989. Xinjiang fenci (The advancing 40 years. 
1949-1989. Xinjiang Volume), Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, Urumchi, 1989, p. 332; 
2002 Xinjiang tongji nianjian (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook), Pékin, Zhongguo 
tongji chubanshe, 2002, pp. 107-109. 
 
In the case of 1988, there were also various protests by the students of 
Uyghur Universities in Urumçi. The origin of these conflicts was started on June 15 
when two student leaders of the Student Science and Culture Union
114
 in Xinjiang 
University had meetings with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party 
Committee vice chairman, the Planning Committee director, the Education 
Committee director and the Finance Committee director for six hours. During these 
meetings student leaders demanded to stop the disparity between the Chinese and 
Uyghur education systems as well as the ethnic discrimination, and the 
implementation of the Autonomous Regions Policy of PRC. However, Chinese 
authorities refused their demands and therefore, some 5,000 students protested on 
city streets. Although this demonstration was peacefully without any incident, 
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authorities called this protest as "June 15 riot," and not only placed thirty student 
leaders under close surveillance but also questioned them intensely.
115
 Because it 
was consisted of a number of Turkic students in the demonstration, this incident was 
also evaluated as one aspect of the Pan-Turkism.
116
 
Meanwhile, Chinese government began to worry about the religious revival 
in the Uyghur identity. These worries increased dramatically in 1989. On May, 
Muslim students marched in Urumçi in a demonstration organized by Hui students to 
express rage at the publication in Shanghai of Sexual Customs (Xing Fengsu), a book 
containing insulting misrepresentations of Islam with the statement that Muslim 
culture was centered on sex.
117
 This demonstration also turned in People‘s Square in 
Shanghai, where cars, motorbikes and windows were smashed and students clashed 
with police, leaving almost 200 injured.
118
 Moreover, 3,000 Muslims also protested 
the publication of this book in Beijing.
119
 Because of a series of demonstrations, the 
book was ultimately withdrawn by both Chinese authority and its publisher, and 
government ordered the authors to apologize in public. As a religious protest, this 
event became a critical reference to the history of Chinese policy related to its 
Muslim subjects.  
In 1989, the Tiananmen Square protests
120
 in Beijing made the atmosphere 
of Eastern Turkistan grow tenser. Especially during the period of the Tiananmen 
Square protests, ÖrkeĢ Dölet (1968-   ) who fled China after this incident and now 
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lives in Taiwan rose to fame as a Chinese/Uyghur student leader. He also achieved 
prominence while studying at Beijing Normal University as a hunger striker who 
rebuked the Chinese Premier, Li Peng (1928-    , 4
th
 Premier of the PRC 1988-1998), 
on national television.
121
 Moreover, by December 1989 with the collapse of Eastern 
European communism as the outside effect, Chinese government became 
increasingly sensitive to discontent of ethnic minorities, including Uyghur, that is 
continued even until today. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
UYGHUR SECESSIONISM IN 1990S-SELECTED CASES 
 
 
 
There were a series of disturbances and unrests over Eastern Turkistan in the 
decade of 1990s. In the history of Uyghur secessionism, situation of 1990s includes 
transitional factor that connects the past historical background with the current 
problem of Eastern Turkistan. Accordingly, to examine condition of 1990s plays an 
important role in understanding contemporary Uyghur secessionism. A Chinese 
―White Paper‖ demonstrates the situation of 1990s from Chinese point of view as 
follows: 
Especially in the 1990s, influenced by religious extremism, 
separatism and international terrorism, part of the "Eastern Turkistan" 
forces both inside and outside China turned to splittist and sabotage 
activities with terrorist violence as their chief means. Some "Eastern 
Turkistan" organizations openly stated that they would use terrorist and 
violent means to achieve their purpose of separation. The "Eastern 
Turkistan" forces in China's Xinjiang and relevant countries plotted and 
organized a number of bloody incidents of terror and violence, including 
explosions, assassinations, arsons, poisonings and assaults, seriously 
jeopardizing the lives, property and security of the Chinese people of 
various ethnic groups, and social stability in Xinjiang, and posing a threat 
to the security and stability of the countries and regions concerned.
122
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 Under this national atmosphere, especially since 1996, the Chinese 
authorities have proclaimed various anti-crime campaigns in Eastern Turkistan that 
included purported ―illegal religious activities‖. The Chinese anti-crime campaigns 
of 1990‘s in the region had been conducted as follow; 
       1996: First ―Strike Hard‖ campaign specifically targeting ―splittism and illegal    
              religious activities‖ 
       1997: ―Rectification of Social Order‖ campaign 
       1998: ―People‘s war‖ drive against ―separatist and religious extremists‖ 
       1999: ―Special 100 Days Strike Hard Fight‖ and ―General Campaign against 
          Terrorism‖123 
 
Like this, Chinese government started to recognize the Uyghur secessionism as a 
violent threat to the national security especially during 1990s. 
 At the beginning of the 1990s, Chinese government feared that the 
independence of the Central Asian Republics as well as the spread of radical Islam in 
Afghanistan would have negative effects on Eastern Turkistan in the PRC. This was 
largely because the independence of other important Turkic populations of Central 
Asia (or Western Turkistan) could lead to strengthening of the Uyghur secessionism. 
Moreover, the cultural connections that bind the Uyghurs together with the peoples 
of the new neighboring Republics and also with the Uyghur diaspora in these 
countries made Chinese government to worry about that solidarity could build up 
between the Uyghur secessionists and these Republics.
124
 In fact, some of them, 
especially Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have provided asylum for the new refugees 
and even recognized various organizations of the local diaspora supporting the 
Uyghur secessionism.
125
 Accordingly, Chinese government tried to cut off the 
militants‘ activities in Eastern Turkistan from these potential outside supporters. The 
PRC suggested the prospects for economic cooperation and promoted cooperation in 
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the struggle against secessionism as well as religious radicalism in Central Asia 
through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
126
 Through such a process, 
Chinese government persuaded the Central Asian Republics to prevent the activities 
of the Uyghur organizations present on their territories.
127
  
 In this manner, it is noticeable that Uyghur secessionism of 1990s included 
international elements in it several ways. A variety of Chinese sources had claimed 
the existence of ‗foreign forces‘ behind the secessionists in Eastern Turkistan. 
Especially, they pointed to Uyghur exile groups, including the activities of Ġsa Yusuf 
Alptekin (1901-1955, General Secretary of the National Assembly, TIRET 1933-
1934) who was the former Eastern Turkistan member of the GMD Legislative Yuan, 
which is legislative body of the PRC. His son, Erkin Alptekin (1939-  ),
128
 who is 
now active in Turkey and Germany. Moreover, as real security threats to Chinese 
government, Uyghur groups were engaged in political organization and some 
military training abroad. According to a Chinese source, there had been secret 
training camps in southern Eastern Turkistan, which later moved abroad under the 
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Chinese oppression.
129
 Under this situation, Chinese government began to concern 
about activities of Uyghurs in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and even in 
Pakistan.
130
 
 Related to the international aspect of secessionism, the PRC also indirectly 
and directly accused the U.S. of supporting activities of Uyghur secessionists. 
Minister of Public Security, Wang Fang‘s announcement in August 1989 that ―The 
root cause of secessionist instability in Eastern Turkistan lies in the attempt by the 
U.S. and other countries to split and subvert our country,‖ also indicates this point of 
view.
131
 However, the most significant Chinese concern was the international 
attention to human rights violations in Eastern Turkistan. Amnesty International as 
well as Human Rights Watch and the U.S. State Department‘s Human Rights Report 
all started to examine Uyghur people‘s human rights issue under the Chinese rule.132 
With the increased openness of the region to not only such organizations but also 
global society, the Uyghur secessionism took an international dimension from the 
1990s on. 
 Meanwhile, Bhattacharya pointed out that there are three main 
characteristics in the 1990‘s Uyghur secessionism in his article ―Conceptualising 
Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism.‖ First, although secessionist tendencies 
in Eastern Turkistan are part of the region‘s history, the violent factors in the Uyghur 
secessionism were started in 1986 when a few Uyghurs first joined the anti-
Communist Jihad in Afghanistan. Second, the increasing Uyghur people‘s 
dissatisfaction pointed to the geographical reach of secessionism. Bhattacharya 
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suggested the bomb explosions in Beijing as the example of threat extent. Last, some 
Uyghur groups were influenced by the concept of jihad that the Afghan Mujahideen 
were practicing.
133
 His points indicate that Uyghur secessionism in 1990s includes 
not only extended scale in the movement but also in some part tendency of religious 
radicalism.    
 Including Bhattacharya‘s three characteristics, Barın uprising in 1990 and 
Gulca in 1997 have significance among various disturbances in 1990s. This is largely 
because these resulted in a number of deaths as well as arrests during incidents and it 
is deeply related to the international action of the problem of human rights. Therefore, 
in this chapter, as representative incidents of 1990s, Barın and Gulca uprisings were 
inquired into the case studies. This will help to understand transitional characteristics 
of Uyghur secessionism that include the aspects of both past and contemporary 
secessionism through the real demonstrations and approach to these incidents.    
 
3.1 Barın uprising in 1990 
 3.1.1. Background 
The Barın uprising, known in Chinese as the Barın County Counter-
Revolutionary Armed Rebellion,
134
 initiated the cycle of violence during the 1990s 
of violent Uyghur uprisings and Chinese crackdowns. In fact, Barın county, Akto 
township
135
 had been named an ―Ethnic Unity Model Town‖ in 1984.136 However, 
six years later this name became ironic when an armed Uyghur uprising started to 
rebel in there against the Chinese rule. Although there had been various violent 
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clashes before in Eastern Turkistan, Barın is regarded different because of the 
―claimed‖ qualities of foreign money and supporters as well as the quantities of 
weapons and explosives captured. The Chinese government also evaluated that the 
Barın uprising was a well planned, well organized, and premeditated act of ethnic 
secessionists hidden in the region.
137
 Furthermore, the Chinese government admitted 
that it was the most serious incident carried out by the ethnic secessionists since the 
invasion of Eastern Turkistan.
138
 
 The main purpose of Barın uprising was to resist Chinese repression and 
politicalize Eastern Turkistan issue by mobilizing Uyghurs.
139
 Uyghurs also 
demanded to end the Chinese colonial rule in Eastern Turkistan and re-establish the 
Eastern Turkistan Republic, which existed during the 1940s. However, it is necessary 
to remember that there was the fundamental Uyghur‘s dissatisfaction with Chinese 
one-sided political aspects. For example, some report suggest that underlying 
complaint was not only Chinese mass migration to Eastern Turkistan but also 
political application of birth limits to minority ethnic groups in 1988, although today 
Uyghurs in cities are legally limited to have two and those who live in the 
countryside to have three children.
140
  
 
3.1.2. Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP) and Barın uprising 
The uprising of Barın was initially organized by the Eastern Turkistan 
Islamic Party (ETIP) under the leadership of Zehidin Yusuf and the preparations for 
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the uprising began as early as 1988.
141
 Before the Barın uprising took place, the ETIP 
had conducted a series of planning exercises and detailed preparation, including a 
plan to expand their organization all over Eastern Turkistan. Smuggled weapons for 
uprising had been stockpiled, and organizers had been spreading the message of jihad 
beforehand.
142
 There were also various schemes of ideological discussion, task 
sharing, financial support, food supplies, weapons, and combat training etc.
143
  
Initially, as the plan of organization was partially exposed to the Chinese 
security service by March 1990, the organizers of the uprising had to change their 
initial plan and to speed up their activities. As a result, the style of member 
recruitment of the ETIP was changed from underground to public, from individual 
recruiting to group recruiting, and from tricking to threatening.
144
 Moreover, in this 
process, ETIP formed its major military force, the ―Islamic Warriors‖ mainly from 
young people.
145
 They intensified propaganda about the armed uprising, setting up 
loudspeakers in the villages of the Barın area to proclaim the uprising against 
Chinese occupation in Eastern Turkistan.
146
 
 On April 5, 1990, the Barın riots started with the ETIP‘s active efforts in 
mosques, followed with a mass protest. In the early morning, some 200 Uyghurs 
surrounded the compound hosting government and security offices for Barın county, 
Akto township.
147
 The crowd requested the expulsion of the Chinese, claiming that 
―United all the Turk peoples, long live the great Eastern Turkistan, take Barın, 
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establish Eastern Turkistan.‖ 148  Later that afternoon, the situation became more 
aggressive with some 300 men surrounding the same compound. Although five 
policemen had been sent to arrest Zehidin Yusuf, they were seized and their guns 
and other equipment were taken by rebels. Besides, at a nearby bridge some 
Uyghurs ambushed two cars from the Barın Armed Police and killed six officers in 
the car with axes and knives, taking a few guns before torching the vehicles.
149
 
In the night, Yusuf‘s fellows warned an ultimatum threatening to attack if 
those barricaded in the compound did not hand over all arms stored within. After all, 
shooting broke out as the some Uyghurs reportedly threw homemade grenades into 
the compound. During this moment, Zehidin Yusuf was shot and the besiegers fled. 
In that time, Zehidin Yusuf was 30 years old.
150
 In the end, artillery troops and four 
battalions of infantry from the southern Eastern Turkistan military district dominated 
the entire area of Barın, scattered the Uyghurs holding the bridge, and pursued 16 
Uyghurs who fled into the mountains.
151
  
According to local people, several thousand people took part in the uprising, 
while the Chinese authorities asserted that there were fewer than 200 participants.
152
 
Although the Chinese government tended to reduce the scale of this uprising, its real 
response to control the incident included firmly systemic and strong ways. Among 
the government armed forces acted in the Barın incident, there were three control 
departments; Public Security Police, the People‘s Armed Police, the army, and even 
some of its special units were sent not only from ArtuĢ and other nearby prefectures, 
but also from Urumçi.
153
 Some of them were even sent by air from China proper to 
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help crackdown the uprising. The scale of the protest in Barın was such that the 
Public Security Bureau personnel and the People‘s Armed Police had to be 
reinforeced by up to 1000 regular PLA troops.
154
 Furthermore, one Chinese source 
revealed the list of weapons confiscated by authorities from Barın participants as 
follows: 16 guns, 470 bullets of various types, 243 earthenware hand grenades, 512 
blasting caps, 53 kilos of blasting powder, 180 knives of all sizes, three motorcycles 
and five horses.
155
  
Likewise, Becquelin argues that, the implication of Barın uprising was 
extremely serious because of its scale and evident organization of the insurgents: 
 
The conjunction of organizational sophistication, radical Muslim ideology 
and the weaponry used by the insurgents was far beyond the expectations of 
the security apparatus, suggesting foreign support from across the borders. 
The uprising took three days to quell and resulted in more than 30 deaths and 
numerous casualties.
156
 
 
The scale of this uprising provided China with deep suspicions of external influences 
penetrating Eastern Turkistan and stirring up nationalist sentiments among Eastern 
Turkistan‘s ethnic minorities. 
 In that time, Chinese media and government placed the responsibility for the 
Barın uprising on Ġsa Yusuf Alptekin in Ġstanbul.157 One Chinese source also reports 
that 16 rebels were killed in fighting, 124 arrested, 508 detained for questioning, 40 
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convicted, 3 executed and 378 released after education in this period.
158
 However, 
Amnesty International has denied that report through unofficial sources which is 
consisted of eyewitnesses‘ testimonies, claiming that up to 50 Uyghurs were killed 
by Public Security Forces including some killed by both mortars and gunfire from 
helicopters.
159
 Furthermore, an Uyghur source argued that about 5,000 Uyghurs were 
killed and 7,000 arrested in this period.
160
 That is, although the uprising did not last 
long, there was no precise information not only from the local population due to fear 
under strong the Chinese surveillance but also from the Chinese government. That is 
why a variety of information related to this uprising mostly depends on the 
testimonies of eyewitnesses. 
 
3.1.3. Different sources about the scale of Barın uprising  
According to several local people, who later fled from China, the death toll 
must have been hundreds, most of them being participants in the uprising.
161
 Another 
eyewitness asserts that it is estimated that between 22 and 50 people were shot 
dead.
162
 Western sources gave a more detailed death toll: 22 Uyghurs killed during 
the events of April 5 and 6, more than 60 killed on April 12.
163
 It was said that a 
fourteen-year old boy also participated in this uprising and even killed a policeman. 
This young boy was later caught by government forces, and his whereabouts was not 
clear. According to the rumors in the street, he was executed secretly by the Chinese 
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authorities.
164
 An Uyghur report also explains that a seven months baby was killed 
by 77 bullets during the event of Barın uprising. 165  All these accounts indicate 
Chinese government‘s severe responses to the uprising. 
 
3.1.4. Afterward 
As a result of Barın uprising, the Chinese government started to step up 
security measures after the event. First, after the Barın uprising the number of police 
forces was increased including 28,000 additional armed police, and police power 
was changed as specialist riot-control units.
166
 For making firm surveillance system 
by the secret police, Uyghur spies were also recruited. Furthermore, cameras were 
set up in mosques and those who attend to the religious ceremonies were listed and 
photographed.
167
 Under this condition, Chinese media continued to oppress and 
condemn Uyghur secessionism. As a result, 50 religious sites in that district were 
closed by the Eastern Turkistan authorities and they ordered construction halted on 
153 mosques.
168
 Furthermore, Chinese investigations were conducted over some 
12,000 religious figures.
169
 
Related to the Barın uprising and Chinese response to it, a Xinjiang 
provincial Communist Party meeting on July 1990 came to the conclusion that ―the 
most important lesson identified was that; for a long time, our Autonomous Region 
did not have a unified vision that national secessionism is the main danger for 
Xinjiang…The task of fighting ethnic secessionism has not been carried out in a top-
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to-bottom fashion. This lesson is very important, and we still need to pay full 
attention to it today‖.170 In other words, the Barın uprising played a significant role 
in strengthening Chinese security policy connected to the various ethnic minority 
groups as well as reviewing the Eastern Turkistan problem. 
 
3.1.5. Conclusion 
The Chinese government concluded that the Uyghur secessionist movement 
in Eastern Turkistan has become a unified movement in 1990s. There is not only an 
organizational unity, but also an ideological unity. As proven by the Barın uprising, 
the ETIP is a representative example. This was an underground political 
organization with a relatively complete programme of objectives, including concrete 
strategy of uniting and absorbing other secessionist forces in Eastern Turkistan. As a 
result, the ETIP has successfully developed its branches and members in more than 
20 cities and counties in south and east of Eastern Turkistan.
171
 With such collective 
activities, not only to the ETIP but also to entire Uyghur people, the Barın uprising 
became a symbol and played an important role in providing motivation for other 
Uyghur protests. 
 
3.2 Gulca uprising in 1997  
3.2.1. Background 
The increased opposition of Uyghurs during the 1990s coincided with the 
Chinese government‘s renewed suppression of religious expression, which included 
limiting mosque construction as well as prohibiting religious education and 
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supervision of religious leaders.
172
 As the starting point of the greater violence, the 
government launched ―Strike Hard‖ anti-crime campaign in 1996, broadening it to 
crackdown on Uyghur secessionist groups and at the same time creating tremendous 
Uyghur disaffection. According to the announcement of Xinjiang Public Security 
Office, ―more than 2,700 terrorists, murderers and other criminals, presumably of 
various ethnic groups as well as 4,000 sticks of dynamite, 6,000 pounds of 
explosives, 30,000 rounds of ammunition, and 600 firearms‖ were captured for two 
months of 1996.
173
 In response to the ―Strike Hard‖ campaign, Uyghur anti-
government protests, violence and terrorist activities have reached to the serious 
levels. Related the scale of the violence, Chinese media noted that foreign ―fanatics‖ 
including the jihadist Afghans were trying to support Uyghur secessionism like the 
case of the Barın. The Gulca uprising was started from this social and political 
atmosphere.  
 The Gulca uprising is regarded as the most severe street violence since the 
Cultural Revolution and the second-largest protest in recent history of Uyghur 
secessionism since the demonstration and hunger-strike of thousands of Han youth in 
Aksu under the communist regime in 1979. Brent Hierman also pointed the 
significance of the Gulca uprising in his article, providing figure 1 related to the 
Uyghur protests in Eastern Turkistan.
174
  
     
     
 
 
                                                 
172
 Paul, p.12. 
173
 Jane Macartney, ―China to build steel Great Wall against separatism,‖ Reuters News Service, June 
4, 1996.  
174
 Brent Hierman, ―The Pacification of Xinjiang: Uighur Protest and the Chinese State, 1988-2002,‖ 
Problems of Post-Communism Vol.54, Issue 3, (2007). 
 45 
Figure 1. Contentious Events Per Year Between January 1988 and July 2002 
 
       Source: Hierman, Brent. 2007. ―The Pacification of Xinjiang: Uighur Protest and 
the Chinese State, 1988-2002,‖ Problems of Post-Communism 54(3): p.49 
 
  As the Figure 1 indicates, the Gulca uprising in 1997 marked the peak of 
Uyghur secessionism. This figure includes empirical justification for labeling the 
Gulca uprising the high-water mark of the expression of Uyghurs‘ dissatisfaction 
with the Chinese rule.   
 
3.2.2. Meshrep 
To understand Gulca uprising, religious background of 1990s also should be 
understood. In 1994, young Uyghurs initiated a movement in the city of Gulca in Ġli 
Prefecture, which is called Ġli Youth Meshrep.175 As an ancient Uyghur tradition, the 
meshrep (religious youth club) is a form of social gathering of people of all ages and 
both sexes, and the gathering the participants feel free to play music, to sing songs 
and to dance. Even today, there are meshrep gatherings in Uyghur populated areas, 
especially in the villages. 
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 Especially, the meshrep organized in Gulca was a particular one as the 
organizers of meshrep wished to solve social problems by reviving such a traditional 
form of social gathering. In that time, one of the significant problems among young 
people who were mostly the uneducated and unemployed was drug abuse. Initially, 
the Ġli Youth Meshrep was organized with the agreement of the local government. 
Several local official cultural institutions supported this organization and they also 
donated various materials for a library set up by the Youth Meshrep. Moreover, they 
tried to revive cultural and ethnic traditions and a sense of moral values. As a result, 
they reportedly achieved some success in reducing the drug problem among the 
young Uyghurs. Meshrep gatherings were organized regularly for a period of 
months in villages. Their activities became popular and had a great influence on 
other areas in Eastern Turkistan. According to some sources, there were soon some 
400 meshrep organizations in the region.
176
 Various meshreps developed into an 
unofficial and increasingly organized even network of boys clubs, including group 
meetings supported a soccer tournament bringing together teams representing 
multiple meshrep activities.
177
  
As the meshreps became more popular, the Chinese authorities apparently 
became increasingly worried about the power of these movements. Finally, Chinese 
government started to investigate the meshrep movement in 1995, refusing to permit 
an inter-meshrep soccer tournament.
178
 In the process of this oppression, Chinese 
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officials even confiscated balls from soccer fields over the Gulca city.
179
 After all, in 
August 1995, one of the initial founders of this movement, Abdul Halil, was arrested, 
together with two other Uyghurs.
180
 This event provoked a protest demonstration by 
young Uyghurs in Gulca the next day. Soon after, the Chinese authorities decided to 
ban the meshreps. However, Uyghurs continued activities of meshrep secretly, 
accompanied by increasing arbitrary arrests over the following 18 months. Uyghur 
discontents apparently grew with government repression. 
 
3.2.3. Gulca uprising 
There was an incident that resulted with Gulca uprising on 4 February 1997. 
In that time, police chased two students whom they suspected of instructing young 
people with religious radicalism in a meshrep. However, they were arrested at a 
mosque and other worshiphers in there tried to prevent the men being taken away. 
As a result, this fighting brought about a large-scale riot in the historical context of 
Uyghur secessionism.
181
 According to the accounts of some other Uyghurs, the 
police had murdered three of arrested 30 women who came together to read Kur’an 
and in the end, their bodies dumped on the street.
182
 Next day, a series of protests 
began in Gulca, as over 100 Uyghur students waving the blue Eastern Turkistan 
Republic flags and seeking an end to China‘s rule in Eastern Turkistan were fired by 
police.
183
 This was the beginning of the Gulca incident.  
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The Gulca demonstration in 1997 was also influenced by a series of 
incidents during the holy month of ramadan.
184
 On 5 February, the demonstration 
started peacefully at nine o‘clock in the morning.185 Several hundred young Uyghurs, 
including women and children, took to the streets of Gulca, shouting religious 
slogans and calling for equal treatment for Uyghurs. According to an eyewitness, 
demonstrators were unarmed and peaceful at that time. However, two hours later 
Armed Police units escorted by trained dogs stopped the demonstrators.
186
 As a result, 
Uyghur demonstrators were blocked by the Security Forces, including units of the 
People‘s Armed Police and Riot Police. They used tear gas as well as water cannon 
to break up the demonstration and violent clashes started to occur as news spread and 
more Uyghur people came out into the streets in various parts of the city. In that time, 
some police officers reportedly opened fire into the crowd.
187
 The police then 
detained hundreds of people, who were loaded into trucks and taken to Yining City 
Police Detention Centre, also known as Yengi Hayat (New Life) Prison.
188
  
Including children and women, the Chinese soldiers hosed these Uyghur 
detainees with icy cold water in the open-air, and kept them there wet for some 
hours in 30 degrees below zero.
189
 It was said that one of the detainees, a young man 
whose name was Abdul Gani, was taken away by the Chinese soldiers when he tried 
to question about their actions, and had dog set on him.
190
 Furthermore, in the 
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following days, those among the detainees who were suffering from severe frostbite 
were taken to hospital, and there some had to have their feet, fingers or hands 
amputated. This was not the end of the Gulca incident. 
In the afternoon of 5 February, a second demonstration began by friends and 
relatives of those who had been detained in the morning. This time, some of the 
protesters were carrying stones and threw them at the police. The police reportedly 
beat the protesters with large wooden clubs over one metre long.
191
 Although several 
hundred demonstrators and bystanders were arrested the same day, the protests 
continued sporadically for two days, spreading to the suburbs.
192
 
By 6 February, a large number of anti-riot squads and troops had been 
brought into the Gulca city. They reportedly went through the streets arresting and 
beating Uyghurs, including children. Moreover, they opened fire on protesters and 
bystanders. Soon after, more troops were brought into the city and, as a result, the 
Gulca city was sealed off for two weeks, being imposed curfew.
193
 
 
3.2.4. Afterward 
Although it is said that 196 Uyghurs were killed, nearly 3,500 arrested and 
1,000 wounded during this incident, the Chinese official death toll of the Gulca 
uprising was noted as only five civilians and four police officers.
194
 Following these 
riots, more than ten anti-Chinese demonstrations took place in Gulca, one involving 
more than 5,000 Uyghurs.
195
 Furthermore, disturbances were continued by a series of 
bomb attacks. Influenced by deaths of Uyghurs in Gulca, on February 12 Uyghur 
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secessionists first derailed a train filled primarily with ethnic Han immigrants 
traveling from Lanzhou to Urumçi. Then on February 25, they bombed three Urumçi 
buses to coincide with the state funeral for Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. In this 
incident, as many as 23 were killed and 74 injured.
196
 Ten days later, in the first 
attack on China‘s capital, Uyghur secessionists also exploded a pipe bomb in a bus in 
Beijing‘s busiest shopping district, Xiden. 197  Furthermore, the following week, 
Uyghur secessionists targeted the Chinese military, bombing an installation in south 
of Eastern Turkistan. Two exiled Uyghur groups in Kazakhstan; the United National 
Revolutionary Front
198
 and the Organization for Eastern Turkistan Freedom,
199
 have 
claimed responsibility for most of the bombings and warn that more bombings will 
come until independence of Eastern Turkistan is achieved.
200
 
The Chinese regime also strongly responded to attacks of radical Uyghurs by 
controlling religious activities and sending more officials to supervise the condition 
of Eastern Turkistan.
201
 In the process, Chinese authorities dispatched 17,000 
officials to villages, work units, and military farms to reinforce propaganda and 
education work and to prevent the spread of such protests.
202
 As a result, it is 
reported that 1,600 Uyghurs were disappeared, although some of them had fled to 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan across the border.
203
 There were lingering concerns 
about the loyalty of local Uyghur officials, and 260 local Uyghur officials who were 
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suspected as sympathetizers of the independence movement were fired.
204
 The 
unofficial reports explain that the number of arrests during two weeks after Gulca 
uprising vary from 3,000 to over 5,000.
205
 According to the personal account of 
Rebiya Kadeer
206
 (1947- ), there were even the people who did not participate in the 
demonstration.
207
     
Related to the condition of the detention during the Gulca uprising, many 
sources also have reported that as almost all the centers of detention in Gulca city 
were full. Therefore, some of those arrested were taken to jails outside the city or 
held to improvised places of detention.
208
 A large number of the Uyghur traders in 
the city were also reportedly detained during the week after the Gulca incident, and 
many of them were robbed by the Chinese soldiers. Those held were not only 
relatives and friends of people arrested during the protests but also anyone suspected 
of being a nationalist sympathizer. Most of those detained were held for several 
weeks or months, and many were even reportedly tortured. Their relatives had to 
give huge sums of money to the police officers in order to secure their release. 
Finally, on  June 26, 1997 the Public Security Bureau of Gulca formally issued an 
announcement related to the Gulca uprising and it stated that people who were hiding 
and protecting criminals were committing a crime and its penalty was death.
209
 The 
Gulca uprising and its oppression lead to a new wave of bombings and repression 
that maintained from 1998 to 2000 and has continued until today to some extent. 
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3.2.5. Human Rights Issue and Unjustification of Chinese government 
Gulca incident has a significance on the ground of not only its domestic 
inequality problem, but also international human rights issues. To date, the Chinese 
authorities did not yet address the impunity surrounding this incident and raises 
serious questions about China‘s commitment to ‗respect and protect human rights‘ as 
incorporated into the Constitution in recent year. According to the testimonies 
gathered by Amnesty International, after being arrested in link with the Gulca 
demonstration, at least two Uyghurs died in custody as a result of torture by Chinese 
government. 
Information of Amnesty International related to this two Uyghurs and those 
who are believed to remain in prison can be helpful to understand the reality of 
human rights issues in the Uyghur secessionism.  
  
 “1.Salam Kari, a young man who had formed a Uyghur football team in 
Ghulja in the 1990s, was arrested in May 1997 by the February protests. A 
few days later, he was dead. His body reportedly showed marks of torture. 
The police reportedly argued that he had committed suicide in prison…. 
  
2.Abdulhelil, a founder of the meshreps, died in custody on 17 October 2000, 
because of repeated torture and beatings. The authorities initially denied his 
death, however, later claimed that he died of a heart failure after contracting 
a respiratory inflammation and myocarditis in prison…. 
 
 3.Ablat Patar, a surgeon from Ghulja military hospital, accused of giving 
medical treatment to ‗nationalist separatists.‘ Unofficial sources suggest that 
he may be held in Yengi Hayat Prison in Ghulja. Further details about current 
legal status remain unknown…. 
 
 4. Iminjan, a 28-year-old teacher, reportedly detained during the Ghulja 
protests in 1997 and tortured in detention. This includes being made to stand 
barefoot in the snow and having cold water poured on him, causing brutal 
frostbite of both feet. He was accused of ‗illegal religious activities‘ in 1998. 
His current status is unknown…. 
 
5. Kasim Haji, Hamit Mejit and Shevket Sakhal (or Shevket Tursun), three 
businessmen arrested in March or April 1997 because of passing information 
about the Ghulja protests to a group of foreign journalists. Unconfirmed 
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reports suggest they were sentenced to 15 or 18 years in prison, however, 
their current conditions remain unknown…‖210 
 
All these information implicates that the Chinese response to the Gulca uprising 
includes not only the violation of human rights but also the absence of justification. 
 Meanwhile, various official Chinese reports are not consistent on the reasons 
and nature of Gulca uprising, ranging from denials that it happened to blaming it on 
religious factors and Uyghur secessionists went on stirring up holy war.
211
 Xinjiang 
Regional Party Secretary, Wang Lequan, also referred to the ―Ili February 5th 
beating, smashing, looting disturbance incident‖ in an internal speech in 1999.212 
Furthermore, in 2002, White Paper of the PRC on terrorism went a step further and 
regarded the incident as a ―serious riot… perpetrated by the Eastern Turkistan 
Islamic Party of Allah and some other terrorist organizations,‖ saying that from 5th 
to 8th February terrorists killed seven innocent people, injured 200, destroyed thirty 
vehicles and burned two houses.
213
 All these facts indicates that there are not enough 
understanding about the nature of the Uyghur problems among Chinese authorities 
and even the exact legitimacy in the Chinese policies for managing to this Uyghur 
uprising.  
 
 
                                                 
210
 ―China: No Justice for the victims of the 1997 crackdown in Ghulja (Yining),‖ Amnesty 
International News, February 4, 2003, http://amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=14333 
(accessed April 1, 2008), p.12. 
211
 Jay Dautcher, ―Reading Out of Print: Popular Culture and Protest on China‘s Western Frontier,‖ in 
Timothy Weston and Lionel Jensen, eds., China Beyond the Headlines, (New York: Rowman & 
Lttlefield, 2000), p.278. 
212
 Wang Lequan, 1999, ‗Secretary Wang Lequan‘s Address to the Khotan District Stability Work 
Conference‘ (Wang Lequan shuji zai Hetian diqu wending gongquo hurishang de jianghua), 27 
August 1999, p.8. Quoted in The World Uyghur Network News, No.59, October, 1, 1997. 
http://www.uygur.org/enorg/wunn97/wunn100197.htm (accessed March 12, 2008). 
213
 PRC State Council Information Office 2002, ‗‖East Turkistan‖ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away 
with Impunity,‘ 21 January 2002, section headed ‗Organizing disturbances and riots and creating an 
atmosphere of terror.‘ http://www.chinaembassy.bg/eng/dtxw/t131736.htm (accessed January 3, 2008). 
 54 
3.2.6. Conclusion 
Since the 1990s, with the political and economic changes in the domestic 
and international situation, the complexity and seriousness of political, social, and 
ethnic troubles have also been intensified, and inevitably, there have been increased 
political incidents in the PRC. The most important outcome of the Uyghur uprisings 
in 1990s was the increasing scale, that is, they have been transformed from 
individual cases to a well-organized collective movement. 
The main political objectives of all these uprisings include similar nature 
and characteristics. The first is obviously to oppose Chinese communist rule, which 
may be a direct evidence of a mismanagement of the ethnic minority policies in 
Eastern Turkistan. Secondly, the uprisings try to revive an independent state and the 
demolition of the Chinese political ruling system in Eastern Turkistan. Thirdly, some 
of the uprisings were initiated with peaceful claims, such as equal rights for Uyghurs, 
religious freedom and true autonomy. However, none of the Uyghur claims has been 
responded by Chinese government properly. There were only series of suppressions 
of the collective movement and then severe punishment of individuals after the 
movement was crushed.   
Recently, some Uyghur expatriates in Europe have renewed the Uyghur 
movement under the banner of ―self-determination.‖214 In other words, they want 
this banner to be integrated into the political ideology of the Uyghur secessionist 
movement in Eastern Turkistan through peaceful methods. Related to Uyghur 
secessionist movement, the Chinese government also has sufficient reason to claim 
that the Uyghur secessionist movement in Eastern Turkistan has an international 
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backing as Uyghur dissidents are fleeing from Eastern Turkistan and joining Uyghur 
expatriate organizations abroad.  
In fact, the Uyghur uprisings do not constitute for the moment a real and 
direct threat to Chinese control over Eastern Turkistan. However, the increasing 
number of political incidents in the 1990s had a great negative influence on the 
fragile composition of Eastern Turkistan‘s society. As a result, these Uyghur 
uprisings, not only in quantity, but also in quality forced the Chinese government to 
reconsider its ethnic minority policies imposed on local populations of Eastern 
Turkistan. In this sense, as the representative incidents of 1990s, uprisings in the 
Barın and the Gulca have a major significance in the history of Uyghur secessionism. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 CONTEMPORARY UYGHUR SECESSIONISM IN EASTERN TURKISTAN 
- Impact of 9/11, 2001 
 
 
 
4.1 Before 9/11 
The initial Chinese approach to Uyghur secessionism in Eastern Turkistan 
had been to minimize it by blaming only small core groups of secessionists backed 
by foreign forces. In the late 1990s, Chinese officials in Eastern Turkistan began 
formally discussing the violence in the region. For example, in March of 1999, 
Eastern Turkistan governor, Abdulahat Abdurishit (an Uyghur) claimed openly that 
there had been thousands of explosions, assassinations and other incidents in the 
1990s.
215
 However, Chinese officials moderated their statements relating to the 
Uyghur problems in the early 2000s, perhaps because of the impact of publicity on 
the development of Eastern Turkistan under the Great Development campaign.
216
 
The Eastern Turkistan Party Secretary, Wang Lequan, together with Abdulahat 
Andurishit even proclaimed that the situation in Eastern Turkistan was ―better than 
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ever in history‖ and that ―society is stable and people are living and working in 
peace and contentment.‖217   
However, since the independence of Central Asian (western Turkistan) 
states, Chinese authorities have worried that these states would support Uyghur 
secessionism because of their close cultural and linguistic ties with the Uyghur 
people. Thus, the Chinese government considered more than one million Uyghurs 
living in these countries as a threat, fearing that these people might help Uyghurs in 
Eastern Turkistan to resist Chinese rule in what they regard their traditional 
homeland.
218
 
In 1996, the PRC, Russia and three newly independent Central Asian states 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) created the Shanghai Five
219
 to resolve 
border issues after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was the first transnational 
organization where the Chinese government played an important role in the direct 
and indirect control over the Uyghur secessionist movement.
220
 With the addition of 
Uzbekistan in 2001, the Shanghai Five became the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) which has focused mainly on China's security issues of 
―terrorism, separatism and extremism‖. 221  The SCO has allowed China to use 
political, diplomatic and economic power to oppress Uyghur secessionism in Eastern 
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Turkistan. The ―Peace Mission 2007‖ 222 indicates that this is intended to turn the 
SCO into a military and political alliance to repress the Uyghur people's legitimate 
democratic and human-rights demands. 
 
4.2 After 9/11  
Since its declaration of ―War on Terror‖ in late 2001, the U.S. government 
has expressed unprecedented interest in the religious radicalism in Eastern Turkistan 
through the media. Moreover, after the events of 9/11, developments in the relations 
between the U.S. and the PRC have allowed the PRC to deal with the problem of 
Uyghur secessionism with the same methods employed by the Bush administration. 
Thus, the Chinese government has justified severe measures in its anti-separatist 
campaign and continuous crackdown on not only religion, but also other aspects of 
life for the Uyghur by virtue of the political slogan of hegemonic power.  
Actually, the al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11 changed the grounds underlying both 
China‘s new diplomatic position in the region and anti-terrorism policies. After 9/11, 
the Chinese government started to consider this new international situation carefully. 
Although the war in Afghanistan played an important role in eliminating the Taliban 
and guerilla camps that were training Uyghurs, it also placed the U.S. military in the 
range of the Chinese influence. In fact, in preparing for the invasion of Afghanistan, 
the U.S. made separate agreements with Central Asian countries for military bases 
and landing rights.
223
 In the end, in responding to 9/11, Chinese authorities started to 
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concentrate on the Uyghur problem, having the chance to turn the official PRC 
position on Uyghur secessionism on its head. 
In fact, a paper entitled ―‘Eastern Turkistan‘ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get 
Away with Impunity‖ which was released by the PRC State Council Information 
Office in late January 2002 includes the new approach of Chinese government. First, 
while the Chinese government used neither ―Eastern Turkistan‖ nor ―terrorism‖ in 
earlier documents, it started not only to regard Uyghur secessionists as what it now 
called ―Eastern Turkistan terrorists‖ but also to connect them to the international 
terrorists and groups, such as Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.
224
 Second, by virtue 
of using the general terminology ‗Eastern Turkistan forces,‘ this paper proposes that 
all terrorist activities and deaths in the 1990s were led by a unified single terrorist 
organization, although there is no direct evidence to support this statement.
225
         
 Despite the renewed oppressive attitude of the Chinese government, the 
Uyghur secessionist movement has been continuing both inside and outside Eastern 
Turkistan. In particular, Rebiya Kadeer, who was a prominent Uyghur 
businesswoman, is regarded as the most notable Uyghur activist in contemporary 
Uyghur secessionism. In August 1999, Kadeer was detained on her way to meet a 
visiting delegation from the U.S. Congressional Research Service to complain about 
political prisoners in Eastern Turkistan. She spent seven years in prison on charges of 
―leaking state secrets.‖226 However, the definition of state secrets in the law of PRC 
was very vague. Meanwhile, in 2004 she won the Rafto Prize for Human Rights and 
in 2006, she was nominated by the Swedish parliamentarian Annelie Enochson for 
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the Nobel Peace Prize.
227
 Regarding her nomination, Annelie Enochson stated, 
―Rebiya Kadeer champions the rights of Western China's Uighur ethnic group and is 
one of China's most prominent advocates of women's rights... She has also used her 
resources as founder and director of a large trading company in northwestern China 
to provide fellow Uyghurs with training and employment.‖228 On June 5, 2007 at a 
conference on democracy and security held in Prague, Rebiya Kadeer met privately 
with President of the U.S., George W. Bush and Mrs. Bush. In his speech, President 
Bush said about her,  
―Another dissident I will meet with here is Rebiya Kadeer, whose sons have 
been jailed in what we believe is an act of retaliation for her human rights 
activities. The talent of men and women like Rebiya is the greatest resource 
of their nations—far more valuable than the weapons of their army or oil 
under the ground. So America calls on every nation that stifles dissent to end 
its repression, trust its people and grant its citizens the freedom they 
deserve.‖229  
 
The comments of Enochson and Bush demonstrate well Rebiya Kadeer‘s 
valuable career and her significance in Uyghur secessionism. Currently, as the 
president of the World Uyghur Congress by its second General Assembly meeting 
held in 2006 she is trying to seek for the wishes of Uyghur people.
230
 In 
contemporary times, not only Rebiya Kadeer, but also other representative Uyghur 
activists play significant roles as symbols of motivation for the independence of 
Eastern Turkistan and of protection of Uyghur human rights.  
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In this chapter, the situation of contemporary Uyghur secessionism will be 
examined with special consideration of the significance of 9/11 in the international 
context. As a turning point, 9/11 has had a great influence on the contemporary 
Eastern Turkistan problem. In other words, contemporary Uyghur secessionism has 
entered a new phase as a world issue, attracting international attention related not 
only to human rights issues but also to religious radicalism in the region. In the 21st 
century, as one of the most representative and formal activities of Uyghur 
secessionism, the Eastern Turkistan Government in Exile (ETGE) in the U.S. has 
played a leading role in seeking peaceful independence of Eastern Turkistan through 
a political struggle. Although this government has failed to attract sufficient 
international attention and support, it has symbolic meaning in that the political stage 
for the Uyghurs to present Eastern Turkistan issues to international society was 
opened. Moreover, examining Uyghur secessionist activities in cyberspace and 
conceptualizing religious radicalism will also be helpful in understanding the 
changed facets of conflict between Eastern Turkistan and the PRC today. 
 
4.2.1 Religious Radicalism  
4.2.1.1. Background 
As one of the important characteristics of contemporary Eastern Turkistani 
secessionism, the aspect of religious radicalism has been increased both at home and 
abroad under the banner of ―fighting Islamic jihad (holy war).‖231 According to a 
Chinese report in 1999, Eastern Turkistan had 23,000 officially registered mosques 
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(in 1999), compared to 2,000 in 1978.
232
 This number has been linked by the 
moderate religious policy of Chinese government.  
In fact, Uyghurs have used a variety of methods to carry out Uyghur 
secessionism through religion in Eastern Turkistan. They produced various religious 
books and tapes which promoted the Uyghur secessionist movement and also held 
religious seminars. Religious activities of the Uyghurs in foreign countries were 
somehow related to the radical aspects of Uyghur secessionism. In other words, the 
religious radicalism which aims using jihad as an ideological weapon has called all 
the Muslims of the world to unite has influenced Uyghur secessionism in Eastern 
Turkistan as well. 
 One Chinese report explains the situation of the religious radicalism in 
Eastern Turkistan as follows:  
 They attacked the ethnic and religion policy of Party, and strongly 
promoted ethnic animosity and religious fanaticism and ―Islamic Jihad,‖ 
openly called for armed counter-revolutionary riot and establishment of an 
independent ―Eastern Turkistan Republic‖ with the support of foreign forces. 
A serious of ethnic separatism incidents that occurred since the peaceful 
liberation Xinjiang, the uncovered counter-revolutionary organizations such 
as ―Eastern Turkistan People‘s Revolutionary Party,‖ ―Eastern Turkistan 
Islamic Party‖ and ―Eastern Turkistan Youth Party,‖ and seek to split out 
Xinjiang from our motherland…It has become a mental opium, mental terror 
and mental shackle for people, but a mental weapon for the small number of 
ethnic separatists.
233
 
  
As seen in the quotation, Chinese authorities has perceived a consolidation of  
fundamentalist and militant Islam in Eastern Turkistan and have often warned about 
the threat of Uyghur secessionism and religious radicalism.
234
 All these statements 
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reflect the Chinese perspective that the religious radicalism and the Uyghur 
secessionist movement are deeply interdependent and even identical.  
Actually, after Deng Xiaoping came to power, hajj (pilgrimage) missions to 
Mecca were resumed in October 1979, the Chinese government essentially lost its 
control over religion in Eastern Turkistan.
235
 Many thousands of Eastern Turkistan 
Muslims started returning from Mecca with religious resources such as video 
cassettes and literature which encouraged religious radicalism. Moreover, in the 
relatively free political atmosphere of the 1980s, various traditional religious 
activities were revived. Since then, the Uyghurs have tried to continue expanding 
religious activities through the Meshrep meetings where religious issues are 
discussed publicly as well.
236
 Similarly, foreign Muslims were allowed to visit 
Eastern Turkistan. Such a religious revival atmosphere in Eastern Turkistan not only 
resulted in the strengthening of thoughts about secessionism and autonomy but also 
provided the ideological foothold for aspects of religious extremism.  
 
4.2.1.2. Cases of Religious Radicalism 
Despite its limited scale, some Uyghurs inside and outside of Eastern 
Turkistan have also emphasized the importance of studying religion and the 
expansion of religion‘s influence among Uyghur youth. Domestic radical groups, the 
Uyghurstan Liberation Front and the United National Revolutionary Front of 
Eastern Turkistan (UNRF) were claimed to be joined in a jihad in Eastern 
Turkistan.
237
 According to the same source, the UNRF announced that they had 
                                                 
235
 Yitzhak Shichor, ―Blow Up: Internal and External Challenges of Uyghur Separatism and Islamic 
Radicalism to Chinese Rule in Xinjiang.‖ Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol.32, No 2, Summer 
2005, p.122. 
236
 Yitzhak Shichor, p.122. 
237
 Davis and Aizian, p.52. 
 64 
killed an imam of a mosque in KaĢgar in 1996 because of his pro-China attitude.238 
This instance reveals fundamentalist characteristics of some parts of the Uyghur 
secessionist movement. 
Outside influences on Uyghur religious radicalism, especially from countries 
with a radical Islamic orientation, played an important role in promoting the radical 
aspects of religion in Eastern Turkistan. For example, the Taliban of Afghanistan, 
the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia and the Tableeghi Jamaat based in Pakistan 
all encouraged religious fundamentalism in the region.
239
 Some Uyghurs has been 
claimed to have religious training in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other Central Asian 
states to a lesser extent.
240
 There were also reports claiming that a large amount of 
weapons have been sent from Afghanistan to the border regions of Pakistan, 
Kashmir, and Tajikistan.
241
  
As one of the most important radical groups which has influenced and 
recruited Uyghurs, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) had a direct 
connection in Eastern Turkistan with the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement 
(ETIM).
242
 The goal of IMU was expanded from the establishment of an Islamic 
state in Uzbekistan to the creation of an Islamic state for all of Western and Eastern 
Turkistan after changing its name to the Islamic Party of Turkistan in 2001.
243
 
According to an American report, Uyghurs were found at several camps in 
Afghanistan after the war in 2001.
244
  
Meanwhile, Pakistan seems to reduce her support to the unrest in Eastern 
Turkistan by virtue of her national concerns on the security relationship with 
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Chinese government.
245
 According to the Eastern Turkistan Information Center on 
December 2, 2000, ―two Uyghur Community Centers which had provided shelters 
for new Uyghur immigrants in Pakistan for decades were closed, KaĢgar Center on 
December 1 and Khotan Center on December 2, by Pakistani Army. Hundreds of 
Uyghurs who had been living in those centers were evicted by Pakistani soldiers.‖246 
Furthermore, joint military exercises between Pakistan and the PRC in Eastern 
Turkistan in August 2004 indicated that the Pakistani government had changed its 
political position drastically.
247
   
  
4.2.1.3. Response of Chinese Government 
Sensing a threat to increased religious unity, the Chinese government 
responded by restricting the contacts between Eastern Turkistan and its neighboring 
countries. As one of the measures taken against the radical religious aspect in the 
Uyghur secessionism, the Chinese government tried to develop ties with neighboring 
states to restrict the operations of Islamic groups. For example, in April 1996, Jiang 
Zemin, the Chinese President, signed an agreement with his counterparts from 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that included calls to oppose the religious 
fundamentalism in Eastern Turkistan.
248
Actually, according to a Chinese report in 
2002, the Chinese government was overtly trying to connect Eastern Turkistan 
secessionism with bin Laden and other terrorist networks; 
The ―East Turkistan Islamic Movement‖ headed by Hasan Mahsum is 
supported and directed by bin Laden. Since the formation of the ―East 
Turkistan Islamic Movement,‖ bin Laden has schemed with the heads of the 
Central and West Asian terrorist organizations many times to help the ―East 
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Turkistan‖ terrorist forces in Xinjiang launch a ―holy war,‖ with the aim of 
setting up a theocratic ―Islam state‖ in Xinjiang.‖249 
 
As a response Hasan Mahsum was stating that although some individuals may have 
been drawn to the Taliban, there were no organizational connections and they did 
not receive any funds from al-Qaeda during a telephone interview with Radio Free 
Asia.
250
  
Although there is no question about the existence of religious radicalism in 
Eastern Turkistan, the crucial problem is the fact that it is difficult to identify the 
genuine radicals among a disaffected population—to differentiate the dissident from 
the radical activist. The Chinese media and government authorities do not try to 
explain the cause of the Uyghur unrest, but focusing only on extremist behaviors 
among various groups standing for secession. Therefore, it is necessary to define 
religious radicalism and its real impact and dimensions.  
 
4.2.1.4. Reality of Religious Radicalism 
Currently, ―foreign countries‘ support‖ for religious radicalism has a 
tendency of demise in the region. In other words, the increased Chinese pressures on 
Islamabad as well as the U.S intervention in Afghanistan reduced the extent of 
fundamentalism among Uyghurs. Even security checks at the Eastern Turkistan 
border gates are tightly conducted.
251
 Furthermore, it is difficult to develop a radical 
influence in the region due to the tight Chinese control over religion. First, the 
Chinese government accepted only religious material published by the PRC‘s 
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Religious Affairs Bureau.
252
 Another example of restrictions on religious freedoms is 
that there is only one religious school that trains Muslim clergymen in Eastern 
Turkistan, ‗the Xinjiang Islamic Religion Institute‘ in Urumçi. Not only its 
curriculum but also the appointments of Muslim clerics are determined by the China 
Islamic Association, which is an official institution under state administration.
253
 
Hajj pilgrimage was tightly controlled by the Chinese government and was permitted 
only for Uyghurs over 50 years of age.
254
 Actually, by the early 1990s, mosque 
construction and renovation were severely limited; in addition, religious education 
and the public broadcasting of sermons outside mosques were banned.
255
 All these 
situations demonstrate the reality of oppression by the Chinese government in 
Eastern Turkistan. 
In sum, although the PRC‘s official documents claim that religious 
radicalism in Eastern Turkistan has been increased, in fact, the role of Islam in the 
region has been exaggerated by the Chinese political oppression. ―The struggle of 
the Chinese government against religious radicalism‖ has been used to justify human 
rights violations against Uyghurs‘ non-violent political, religious, and cultural 
activities. Yitzhak Shichor explains the reasons of why the Chinese government has 
frequently exaggerated the Uyghur religious radicalism: First, the Chinese 
government would like to ―preempt a likely deterioration in the ethno-religious 
power balance‖ in Eastern Turkistan. 256  Second, the perception of religious 
radicalism can be used to justify and legitimize a further oppression campaign over 
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Eastern Turkistan.
257
 Last, by virtue of demonstrating connection between the 
Uyghur secessionist movement and religious radicalism as a threat in connection 
with global ―terrorism,‖ the PRC can gain potential foreign supporters such as the 
U.S. and the Central Asian Republics.
258
 In contemporary Uyghur secessionism, 
religion is regarded as one of the major components of Uyghur identity rather than 
an absolutely dominant factor in the movement. Therefore, it is necessary to 
remember the fact that Islam should not be considered as a source of unrest but as a 
method for the expression of increased social and political frustration from the 
Chinese rule. 
 
4.2.2 Eastern Turkistan Government in Exile  
 4.2.2.1. Formation of Eastern Turkistan Government in Exile 
As one of the most significant evens in contemporary Uyghur history, the 
Eastern Turkistan Government in Exile (ETGE) was started with the desire of the 
independence of Eastern Turkistan. Émigrés from Eastern Turkistan established this 
―government‖ on September 14, 2004 in Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C. with the 
supports of Eastern Turkistan Solidarity Foundation and Eastern Turkistan National 
Congress.
259
 Anwar Yusuf Turani, who was the Prime Minister of the government 
said, ―The Eastern Turkistan people ask to control their own fate,‖ 260 in a statement 
posted on the internet. According to his statement, the main purpose of this 
government is ―to seek to join the international community of nations in openness 
and peace,‖ and the new government represented not only Uyghurs, but also other 
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minorities such as the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz who inhabit in Eastern Turkistan.
261
 
ETGE press releases also included the goals of government as follows: 
The Eastern Turkistan Government in Exile seeks to tell the world about 
Eastern Turkistan and to raise the cause of freedom and independence by, 
among other things, providing information to U.S. government officials and 
policy-makers, developing contacts with the press, fostering alliances with 
like-minded groups and individuals, and sharing the culture of Eastern 
Turkistan with all who may enjoy it.
262
 
 
 After about one month of the formation of ETGE, the government has issued 
a statement against the cultural oppression of Uyghurs by the PRC. According to its 
content, although the constitution of Communist Party includes ‗the party represents 
advanced culture,‘ the so-called Zhunghua culture which is translated as the 
‗Chinese culture‘ in English is only centered on the Han Chinese culture, excluding 
the other 56 ethnic groups living in the PRC.
263
 The activities of ETGE are related 
not only with the Uyghur secessionist movement under the Chinese rule but also 
with other countries‘ national issues. For example, on behalf of the Eastern 
Turkistan people ETGE recognized Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state 
and hoped peaceful future of the Kosovar people through a press release on February 
18, 2008.
264
 Furthermore, ETGE continuously have informed the United Nations 
member states about the state of democracy and human rights issues in Eastern 
Turkistan and the condition of the ethnic minorities‘ law in the PRC.265 With such 
activities, ETGE is trying to pursue a path for the realization of its original 
objectivity of full independence.  
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Meanwhile, about the reason why ETGE was established and proclaimed in 
the U.S, Ġsmail Cengiz, the spokesman of ETGE, explained that ―There were no 
other choices…Any other countries did not permit both the establishment and the 
proclamination of our government… Although we proclaimed ETGE in the building 
of parliament in Washington, we could not take direction or orientation from the U.S 
government… By using the expression of ‗exile,‘ we wanted to remind Eastern 
Turkistan‘s condition to the world. This is the reason.‖266 In addition, he explained 
that the real aim of ETGE is clearly stated in the Article nine of the second part of 
the ETGE Constitution:
267
 
Article 9: The essential task of the Government-in-Exile of East Turkistan is    
to call the entire international community-that adhere to the principles of 
freedom and democracy, law and order, peace and respect for human rights, 
as well as all international organizations including the United Nation that 
cooperate therewith, to support the independence movement of East 
Turkistan in order to prevent state terrorism under the regime of imperialist 
communist China against the people of East Turkistan.
268
 
 
 After the formation of ETGE, related countries‘ responses to ETGE were 
quite negative. Inevitably, Chinese government had an immediate reaction to the 
establishment of ETGE. After the formal proclamation of the ETGE, various media 
in the PRC have developed an aggressive attitude against it. For example, state-
controlled China News Service reported that the Eastern Turkistan issue was likely 
to play an irritant role in Sino-U.S relations in the future.
269
 Furthermore, Chinese 
Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Kong Quan said at the regular press briefing, ―We 
have said many times that the Eastern Turkistani organization is terrorist. We are 
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strongly opposed to this farce,‖ in 2004 and China hopes ―U.S authorities will treat 
Beijing‘s concerns seriously‖ related to the Eastern Turkistan.270 In the case of the 
U.S. position about this government, Chinese authorities strongly insists that ―The 
U.S government does not recognize any Eastern Turkistan government in Exile, nor 
do we provide support for any such entity‖ in the report. However, in fact, the U.S 
government did mention neither the denial, nor the acceptation about the existence 
of ETGE formally until now.
271
  
  
4.2.2.2. Limits and the Future of ETGE 
Currently, ETGE is often compared with the World Uyghur Congress 
(WUC), which was established on April 16, 2004 in Munich Germany. This 
organization‘s purpose is also to protect ―the right of the Uyghurs to use peaceful, 
nonviolent, and democratic means to determine the political future of Eastern 
Turkistan.‖272 However, some Uyghurs rejected the moderate civil society based 
attitude of the WUC. More politically motivated and independence oriented Uyghur 
groups decided to form the ETGE in Washington rather than to stay as the members 
of WUC.
273
  
After the creation of ETGE, conflicting relations between ETGE and WUC 
have appeared. While ETGE accused the WUC by treason and of compromising the 
aim of independence for a virtual autonomy that Chinese government would not 
accept, WUC responded by saying that ETGE is an empty organization with radical 
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members whose objectives were not realistic.
274
 Actually, the mainstream Uyghur 
exile groups such as Uyghur American Association (UAA) of Washington, D.C. and 
the WUC in Germany did not attend the press conference related to the ETGE 
formation.
275
 Although these tensions between the moderates and the radicals among 
various Uyghur groups resulted with the revival of the secular nationalist Uyghur 
secessionism.   
Like this, although the ETGE has developed a specific governing system 
with a president, a cabinet and a constitution, its outcome seems to have some 
limitations. First, this government is located in Washington D.C., so it is almost 
impossible to communicate with the Uyghurs at the motherland in a regular basis. 
Tibetians, on the contrary, have never left neighboring India for this reason of not 
loosing their regular contact with their motherland. Furthermore, the ETGE is 
destined to depend completely on the foreign policy agenda of the U.S. governments 
due to its geographical location. For example, in the ETGE website, Anwar Yusuf 
Turani places a great emphasis on the role of the U.S. in the ―independence‖ of 
Eastern Turkistan as follows: 
 
―We turn to the United States of America, as the leader of liberty, justice, and 
wisdom, hoping that the United States of America will recognize the just 
cause of freedom and independence of millions of Eastern Turkistanis. We 
turn to the United States of America and free world for compassion and 
leadership to put an end to the misery of so many innocent people.‖276  
 
In this respect, it would be likely to overlook the fact that the essence of the 
Uyghur problem should be resolved not by the influence of the hegemonic power, 
the U.S., but by inner voices of the Uyghurs themselves. Second, it is somewhat 
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doubtable that this government ultimately has any power to play a substantial role in 
the Uyghur independence cause. The ETGE is mainly consisted of representative 
officials who are not directly elected by the Uyghurs in the mainland. They are 
rather representatives from various Uyghur émigré organizations throughout the 
world. That is, to realize the desire of Uyghurs, independence of Eastern Turkistan, 
is needed not only the political activities of various intellectuals but also enough 
political support from the grassroots at home.
277
   
 Despite such vulnerabilities, the ETGE have played a leading role in the 
constitution of political elements for Uyghur secessionism. The creation of ETGE 
was a very meaningful attempt on the grounds that the ETGE provided an 
opportunity to remind the Eastern Turkistan question to the international society. If 
the ETGE can achieve a firm stand in diverse international platforms and gain 
internal political support from the motherland, the existence of ETGE will 
strengthen the foothold for the independence. 
 
4.2.3 Cyber- Secessionism  
4.2.3.1. Background 
The 21st century has given Uyghurs a variety of opportunities to express 
their dissent and achieve their goal of independence. This is largely because the 
usage and development of the internet have allowed Uyghurs to distribute 
information on the activities of Uyghur émigré groups. They have also found new 
opportunities to develop an international public opinion on the situation in Eastern 
Turkistan. As a result, all these aroused international society‘s interests in this region 
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under the PRC rule. Dru C. Gladney named such conditions of the contemporary 
Uyghur secessionism as ―Cyber-separatism.‖278  
 There are many international Uygur émigré organizations with secessionist 
orientations in Ġstanbul, Munich, Melbourne, New York, and Washington, D.C. The 
major problem aroused from the fact that all these émigré groups have lacked any 
healthy communication channels among themselves as well as with the motherland. 
Cyberspace has connected the small Uyghur émigré communities with the 
international society and has allowed them to overcome not only geographical limits 
but also the political censorship imposed by the PRC.
279
 In other words, in 
contemporary times, cyberspace has become a new platform for Uyghur leaders to 
present their unified goal of establishing an independent Eastern Turkistan.   
 The Chinese authorities have taken severe measures to prevent expression of 
dissent by blocking, monitoring, and filtering websites and e-mails in addition to 
some government-sponsored hacking and online propaganda. So, the Uyghurs in the 
motherland cannot easily access secessionist Uyghur websites from within China.
280
 
Accordingly, this has left many Uyghurs in China who can use the internet unable to 
read the various websites of organizations directly linked with the independence 
cause.
281
 This censorship even directed against some websites with pure Uyghur 
history contents. Although some Uyghur websites are accessible to individuals 
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within China, these are the CCP‘s interpretation of the information.282 Therefore, 
many Uyghurs within Eastern Turkistan do not know much about the international 
activities of the Uyghur secessionist movement.  
Meanwhile, access to the internet in Western countries is unrestricted and 
convenient. This is why various websites related to Eastern Turkistan and Uyghurs 
are in English language with the limited usage of Turkish and Uyghur as well.
283
 
These websites play a significant role in the communication and networking among 
émigré groups across continents. Most of their contents are about their organizations, 
news and in many cases inviting others to regular demonstrations. Furthermore, such 
activities through the internet ultimately have a great influence on the sentiments of 
Uyghur nationalism and secessionism under the rule of the PRC. Likewise, today the 
role of cyber- secessionism is remarkable on the ground that it rejects the control of 
the both national and international laws, and contingencies that have influence in the 
physical world. 
One might also admit that, even severely restricted and filtered news about 
Uyghur secessionists‘ activities abroad in the web, when accessed somehow, would 
have an important impact on the compatriots‘ minds in Eastern Turkistan 
 
4.2.3.2. Uyghur Websites 
According to Gladney, there are at least 25 international organizations and 
websites supporting the independence of Eastern Turkistan.
284
 An examination of 
the content of some Uyghur websites might be helpful in learning the ways they are 
shaping the modern Uyghur identity. As one of the most representative Uyghur 
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websites, the Uyghur American Association (UAA)‘s website was established in 
1998. The main mission of the UAA is explained as ―to promote the preservation 
and flouring of a rich, humanistic and diverse Uyghur culture, and to support the 
right of the Uyghur people to use peaceful, democratic means to determine their own 
political future.‖285 The UAA has also undertaken the Uyghur Human Rights Project 
(UHRP), which has the purpose of ―promoting human rights and democracy for the 
Uyghur people and raising awareness of human rights abuses that occur in Eastern 
Turkistan.‖ 286  This website also indicates that it ―does not take a position on 
independence for Eastern Turkistan, but instead focuses its goals on promoting 
human rights and democracy for Uyghurs and others living in Eastern Turkistan.‖287 
As an international organization, the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) also 
plays a significant role in representing the collective interests of the Uyghur people 
both inside and outside Eastern Turkistan. After the Eastern Turkistan National 
Congress and the World Uyghur Youth Congress became one united organization, 
the WUC was established on April 16, 2004 in Munich Germany.
288
 The main 
purpose of the WUC is explained as in its website to promote the right of the 
Uyghur people through peaceful, nonviolent, and democratic ways to achieve the 
political future of Eastern Turkistan.
289
 
Rebiya Kadeer and other Uyghur intellectuals in the U.S. established the 
International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy Foundation (IUHRDF) in 
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2005.
290
 The main mission of IUHRDF is explained as in its website to promote 
human rights, religious freedom, and democracy for the futue of Uyghur people.
291
 
Moreover, the UHRDF is also trying to educate and raise awareness about the 
conditions of the Uyghur people living in Eastern Turkistan throughout the 
international community.
292
 This website is notable in that it is trying to build a 
democratic Uyghur community by strengthening the understanding of the rights of 
women and children as well as the basic human rights of all people, and it stresses 
the importance of nonviolence in their activities.  
As an important informational website, Radio Free Asia (RFA) provides 
various independent news and information to Asian countries whose governments 
restrict the right of access to free press.
293
 According to its website, the main aims of 
the RFA are to ―retain the greatest confidence among its listeners and to serve as a 
model on which others may shape their own emerging journalistic traditions.‖294 A 
number of worldwide institutions honored RFA with various journalism awards over 
the years.
295
 Currently, the content of RFA is in Burmese, Cantonese, Khmer, 
Korean, Lao, Mandarin, the Wu dialect, Vietnamese, Tibetan, and Uyghur. However, 
the Chinese government has regularly criticized and even blockaded its Uyghur 
service.
296
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Among other Uyghur websites, meshrep.com focuses on the cultural and 
traditional aspects of Uyghur identity. As mentioned earlier, meshrep is a cultural 
gathering that is common among Turkic peoples of Central Asia. ‗meshrep.com‘ 
introduces itself as follows:  
We named this page, as ―meshrep.com‖ from the perspective of introducing                           
Uyghur culture, art, music, jokes and songs to those who are interested in 
Uyghur tradition and culture and hoping our effort will offer however small 
the connection between Uyghur and a larger audience in the Western 
world.
297
 
  
Kanat, who himself is an Uyghur intellectual currently living in the U.S., argued that 
this website has ―hosted heated debates among Uyghurs and Uyghur organizations 
from different parts of the world.‖298 Furthermore, by providing huge amount of 
information not only on selective national history but also on important events and 
individuals, meshrep.com is shaping the contemporary Uyghur identity by using 
cyberspace.  
 
4.2.3.3. External and Internal Limitations 
Meanwhile, on the issue of Uyghur cyber- secessionism, the Chinese 
government sticks to its traditional hard-line policy. According to the World Uyghur 
Network News in June 2004, Du Daobin, who posted articles on the internet 
advocating respect for human rights and democracy in China, was sentenced to four 
years of house arrest.
299
 The same article explains, ―With a total of 61 cyber-
dissidents detained, China is the world‘s biggest prison for those who try to express 
themselves freely online. It is also the country where e-mail interception and online 
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censorship have been developed the most.‖300 Furthermore, after the International 
Olympic Committee awarded the 2008 Olympic Games to Beijing in 2001, the 
Chinese government has intensified its persecution of internet users with dissident 
orientations. The internet is regarded by the Chinese government as an important 
strategic area that could not be left to hostile forces.
301
 Currently, China‘s blocking 
services in cyberspace include filter systems that block keywords considered 
―subversive‖ by censors.302 Chinese law severely punished a number of internet users 
under the charges of ―divulging state secrets,‖ ―defamation‖ and ―subversion‖—
charges which are regularly used to suppress the most outspoken critics.
303
  
Actually, Uyghur cyber-secessionism has important limitations due to the 
Chinese government‘s strict online censorship. Table 2 indicates an ―Empirical 
Analysis of Internet Filtering in China‖ as of August-September 2002. For this 
analysis, Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman conducted Google searches for the 
top 100 results for a list of terms. Related to each term listed, the middle column of 
the table indicates the proportion of the top 10 Google results found to be blocked in 
China while the right column shows the corresponding results as among the top 100 
sites for each term.
304
 Regarding the proportion of the top 10 over the terms ―Tibet,‖ 
―taiwan, china,‖ and ―Equality‖ as 100%, we can understand the sensitivity of the 
Chinese government about factors such as independence, nationalism and 
secessionism. Although Table 2 cannot be an absolute indicator of Chinese 
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censorship due to its empirical aspect, this is helpful to estimate the tendency and 
extent of the Chinese censorship, which can be also affiliated with the case of the 
Uyghurs.  
 
Table 2. Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in China 
Google search term  
Proportion of Top 10 Sites 
Blocked 
Proportion of Top 100 
Sites Blocked 
Tibet 100% 64% 
taiwan china 100% 37% 
Equality 100% 24% 
democracy china 80% 42% 
dissident china 80% 37% 
Taiwan 70% 47% 
Revolution 70% 21% 
Dissident 60% 31% 
freedom china 60% 32% 
justice china 60% 30% 
counterrevolution 
china 
50% 21% 
news china 40% 40% 
liberty china 40% 17% 
china blog 30% 11% 
tibet china 20% 39% 
Democracy 20% 34% 
dissident blog 20% 11% 
News 20% 43% 
famine china 20% 23% 
Liberty 20% 28% 
counter-revolution 
china 
20% 21% 
AIDS china 10% 21% 
sex china 10% 19% 
revolution china 10% 18% 
equality china 10% 15% 
Counterrevolution 10% 9% 
War 0% 32% 
Justice 0% 26% 
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Freedom 0% 28% 
war china 0% 24% 
hunger china 0% 24% 
 
Source: Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman, 2002, ―Empirical Analysis of 
Internet Filtering in China,‖ Berkman   Center for Internet & Society Harvard Law 
School, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/block-kw.html 
 
In addition to the external limitations imposed by the Chinese censorships, 
there are also internal limitations caused by the problem of cyber-leadership between 
the nationalists in and out of the motherland. In other words, while purpose of the 
former has been to ―enlist support, win recognition and promote solidarity for the 
cause of Eastern Turkistan independence,‖ in the latter, the objective of the cyber-
leadership has been to ―revive the memory of the two defunct Eastern Turkistan 
republics, and sustain Uyghur culture and language.‖ 305  Moreover, as privileged 
Uyghur intellectuals administrate most of internet sites, such cyber space has 
tendency of overlooking all Uyghur‘s voices.   
  Nevertheless, in modern times, the internet played an important role not only 
in broadening the range of the supporters for any cause but the audience for 
understanding the Uyghur cause in special. It also plays in the justification of the 
Uyghur demand for an independent state. Kılıç Buğra Kanat pointed out the 
significant impact of the use of internet in Uyghur secessionism. He pointed out that:  
―...the use of the Internet by Uyghur migrant groups is providing new insights 
into understanding the relationship between ethnic migrant groups and the 
Internet….the Internet plays an important role in the creation of a new 
Uyghur identity and fostering of nationalist ideas among Uyghur migrant 
groups…‖306  
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There have been limited success in mobilizing the Uyghur secessionist 
movement over the internet. The development of cyber- secessionism is one of the 
most interesting aspects of the contemporary Uyghur secessionist movement. This 
basically shows that there is an increasing space for Uyghur‘s inner voices to be 
heard. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 According to the Olympic Charter, a sport must be ―at the service of the 
harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society 
concerned with the preservation of human dignity.‖307 Although various democratic 
countries are hoping that the Olympic Games will be helpful in improving the human 
rights situation in the PRC relating to the issues of ethnic minorities, the realization 
of this hope seems unlikely and difficult. Although the Chinese government 
promised the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and international societies that, 
it would make improvements in human rights in order to win the competition for the 
2008 Olympics for Beijing, their attitudes have changed after obtaining the Olympics. 
For example, after the IOC vote in 2001, Deputy Prime Minister, Li Lanqing, said 
that ―China‘s Olympic victory‖ must support the country to keep its ―healthy life‖ by 
combating various factors that had ―stirred up violent crime.‖308Actually, one report 
explained that after the decision to give Beijing the 2008 Olympic Games, Chinese 
authorities have oppressed not only the Tibetan and Uyghur people, but have also 
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restricted the activities of foreign journalists.
309
 Furthermore, Hu Jintao, the current 
President of the PRC, asserted that it was ―crucial to fight without equivocation 
against the separatist forces orchestrated by the Dalai Lama and the world‘s anti-
China forces.‖310 All these facts illustrate the Chinese government‘s opportunistic 
political attitude towards the international society.   
 Chinese authorities explained that they have uncovered the plans of two 
Uyghur ―terrorist‖ groups recently (in 2008). This operation included the uncovering 
of a plan by the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan (ETIM) as well. The result was 
to arrest some 45 Uyghurs on suspicion of planning of a suicide-bomb attack and 
kidnaping athletes to disrupt the Olympic Games.
311
 Wu Heping, the Public Ministry 
spokesman, claimed that the ETIM asked its members to do trial operations using 
poison gas and explosive devices. Heping declared the aim of all these was ―to create 
an international incident with the goal of disrupting of the Olympic Games.‖312 
The second terrorist group which was not named at all was accused with also 
the planning of suicide-bomb attacks in Urumçi. It is quite obvious that the Chinese 
government has been using the Olympic Games as an opportunity to crack down on 
Uyghurs under the guise of providing security for an international event. Events in 
Tibet also played an important role in increasing Chinese control over Eastern 
Turkistan. However, as an international event, the Olympic Games can be a valuable 
opportunity for Uyghurs to reach their long-term goal of taking the attention of world 
public opinion. That is, due to the international media‘s interest in the ethnic 
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minority groups in the PRC, during the event, they can appeal to the world about the 
independence of Eastern Turkistan as well as about the protection of Uyghurs‘ 
human rights from Chinese political and cultural oppression through peaceful 
activities.  
As an instance of such an attempt, Dolkun Ġsa, secretary general of the 
Munich-based World Uyghur Congress, has urged for a boycott of the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics, accusing Beijing of ―cultural genocide‖ alongside its crackdown in Tibet. 
He said that China could not be a host of the Olympic Games because of its peaceful 
object.‖313 In the history of Uyghur secessionism, the Olympic Games, just like 9/11 
did, might open a new chapter on the Eastern Turkistan issue.   
The origins of Uygur secessionism could be understood in three contexts 
within a historical continuity from past to the Olympic Games. First, from a 
historical and cultural viewpoint, the fundamental differences between the Chinese 
and Uygurs such as life-styles and languages have created a major reaction among 
Uyghurs against assimilation within the Chinese society.   
From the religious point of view, the spread of religious radicalism in the 
Islamic world has also affected the Uyghurs who have a sincere faith in Islam. As a 
concrete example, some Uyghurs who received their education in some Middle 
Eastern countries has developed a jihadist secessionism.  
Last, since the collapse of communism in other parts of the world in early 
1990s, the spread of nationalism worldwide encouraged Uyghurs to seek to their 
independent state. As an international influence, the independence of former Soviet 
and Yugoslavian countries imbued the Uygurs into the blueprint that they can also 
establish their independent state. In addition, the atmosphere of the increased 
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Chinese nationalism through the radical development of the Chinese economy and 
the extended military budgets of the PRC have accelerated the Uyghur nationalism. 
Combining all these elements, Uyghur secessionist movement has been an attractive 
choice for the dissident Uyghurs in the PRC.   
It is likely that the modern Uyghur secessionism has different characteristics 
from the past versions due to the new wave of tensions between Eastern Turkistan 
and the center. First, various activities of the secessionist movement have been 
extended from domestic ethnic minority issues to an international scale. The support 
of the expatriate groups such as the ETGE and the WUC strengthened this 
characteristic. These organizations have played a significant role in integrating the 
political and cultural Uyghur identities. Second, by virtue of the newly developing 
attraction of the Western media to the Eastern Turkistan problem, after 9/11, 
Uyghurs have had the opportunity to appeal to the international community about 
human rights violations in the PRC. Last, as one of the most significant factors of 
contemporary Uyghur secessionism, the creation of cyber communities inside and 
outside of Eastern Turkistan developed the concept of cyber- secessionism. Also, the 
expansion of the internet user population among Uyghurs strengthened the influence 
of cyber- secessionism. Despite the strict censorship of the Chinese governments, 
Uyghur secessionism in cyberspace has bound together Uyghur émigrés all over the 
globe. 
Just as the aspects of the Uyghur secessionism have changed throughout 
history, the contemporary situation of conflict between the Uyghurs and the Chinese 
government has also entered to a new phase. The Chinese government‘s hold on 
Eastern Turkistan is more strict than ever in the new age of the ―global war on 
terror.‖ In the international context, various sources from a number of international 
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media, human rights groups and expatriate dissidents has been playing an important 
role in challenging the information of the official Chinese version.
314
 The uprisings 
of Barın in 1990 and Gulca in 1997 are representative cases of how the Chinese 
government provided vague information related to the scale and significance of 
events.  
Likewise, the reality of contemporary Uyghur secessionism is all about the 
new position occupied by Eastern Turkistan both within the PRC and at the 
international platforms. The words of Rebiya Kadeer, a ―Uyghur Dalai Lama,‖ in her 
interview represent not only the reality but also the ideal of long-term Uyghur 
secessionism. ―If the Chinese government does not respect it (non-violence), as time 
goes by, the international community and others will recognize it… If the repression 
goes to a point where we cannot control it, things may happen. So it is the interest of 
the Chinese government to recognize our peaceful efforts and negotiate.‖315  
The future of Uygur separatism depends on two aspects largely: the Chinese 
response to Uygur secessionism and the influence of various Uyghur organizations 
that have sought to the secessionism. Currently, the Chinese suppression against 
secessionist movement in Tibet indicates that the Chinese government will not 
change its firm policies about the ethnic minorities in China. Furthermore, despite 
the increased pressures from the international society including the U.S., the Chinese 
government has maintained its position that denies the improvement of political and 
human rights policies for the minorities. Accordingly, the Chinese oppression against 
the secessionist movements of Eastern Turkistan will be maintained in the future.  
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From the inner viewpoint of Uygur secessionism, the Uygur organizations 
seeking to establish an independent Uygur state have been not unified, resulting in 
the splits among themselves. The disharmony of Uygur organizations such as the 
ETGE and the WUC might reduce the legitimacy of Eastern Turkistan struggle 
against China. Also, the inner splits among the Uygur organizations reduce their 
prestiges in the international society. The absence of a major Uygur leader who can 
lead a secessionist movement like the Dalai Lama of Tibet might bring about more 
breakups among Uyghur groups.  
In sum, it will be very difficult for Uyghurs to achieve their goal in the 
forseeable future because of the strict suppression of Chinese government about the 
secessionism of minorities and the inner splits of Uygur organizations. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Map of Eastern Turkistan 
 
 
Source: About Uyghurs of the Uyghur American Association. 
http://www.uyghuramerican.org/categories/About-Uyghurs/ 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Coins of Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan and 
Republic of Uyghurstan 
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APPENDIX C 
 
“Why are we fighting?” 
(Early Rebel Pamphlet of 1944-1949) 
 
 
 
Our fathers and our fathers‘ fathers called the place where we are living "East 
Turkistan." 
From ancient time there have lived in this place Uighurs, Taranchis, Kazaks, 
Uzbeks, and Tatars; at the present time also it is the place of their habitation.  
In this territory, there are counted to be four million people; more than three million 
of them are of these nations (that we have named); for that reason the area–East 
Turkistan–was called the heart of the Turkish nations. Our nearest blood relations are 
Kazaks, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, and Tatars. In the Soviet Union each of these races has 
organized its own Government and its members are living free and joyful lives. Let 
us listen to the white bearded old men among us while they tell us, as they alone can, 
what was the beginning of the history of our East Turkistan nations, and how it 
began. 
Who are we? Who and where are our near and far relations? Where are the 
burial grounds–so so dear to us–of our beloved and renowned ancestors?  
In answer to these questions, any man who seeks the truth and whose heart is 
right can not fail to say that the root of our nation and soul is not in China, but in 
Central Asia, in Kazakistan, Kirghizistan, Uzbekistan, and Tataristan. Our native 
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place is East Turkistan; we are the eastern branch and part of the race–bound to us by 
blood relationship–the other parts of which lie within the Soviet Union; we are the 
part that is fighting.  
Two hundred years ago from Astrakhan and the borders of the Caspian Sea 
there came to our East Turkistan several Kalmuk families and from that time forward 
they lived among us as friends without friction. Thus we see that their roots also not 
in China but sprung from the Russian Kalmuks. If they are asked they themselves 
with confirm this.  
The (White) Russians now resident in East Turkistan can also make the same 
statement about themselves [i.e., that they came not from China but from Russia].  
Of the fourteen nation living in East Turkistan, the ten nations accounted the 
most numerous have had no national, racial, or cultural relationship nor any 
community of blood with the Chinese, nor did any ever exist.  
But through the sands of the desert from remote China there came Chinese to 
our East Turkistan. With the help of sabers and whips and taking advantage of our 
love of peace, the whiteness of our hearts, and our trustfulness, they took into their 
hands the control the whole government; they exacted from us heavy taxes and many 
kinds of contributions; they oppressed us until we had no more rights than animals. 
And they were at that time the least enlightened people in the world; they could not 
give to us brighter lives, they could not increase our knowledge or culture, they could 
not improve the ordinary living conditions of the people; instead they robbed us of 
light, held us in slavery, kept us illiterate and plunged us in darkness. From that time 
forward our territory was called "West China" or "Sinkiang" and it was forbidden to 
pronounce the name "East Turkistan" which the land had borne for years without end 
throughout history.  
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Our fathers and grand fathers were for hundreds of years oppressed by the 
savage Chinese. To understand the nature of that oppression, we need only regard the 
way in which our people are being oppressed by the Chinese at the present time.  
Many times in the past our people have been unable to further to endure this 
oppression; their patience exhausted, they have turned on their savage oppressors and 
fought with great heroism. These battles are known to history. The beloved names of 
our heroic grandfathers who died in these struggles should serve us as banners 
calling us forward to do battle against the Chinese who enslave us!  
In the year 26 and 27
*
 the savage policies of Sheng Turpan began to be put 
in operation, at the time same time that fascism started.  
In the same way that fascism counts as its enemies all people who love peace 
and freedom, thus did Sheng Turpan and savage Chinese who surrounded him count 
us, the native people of East Turkistan, as their enemies and as an inferior race. They 
oppressed us with every kind of cruelty. In 26 and 27 and subsequent years Sheng 
Turpan arrested Ha Jeeneeya, Sherif Jan,
 
and over four thousand others of vanguard, 
of those who were most liked, of those who knew the most, of those who were most 
clever, of those who were outstanding for leadership. Can we forget them?  
After he had arrested them, Sheng Turpan put them in torture cells, beat 
them until their bones were broken, strangled them and poisoned them, until they 
were dead. Their crime in the eye of the Turpan was that he accounted them our 
representatives, who sought for our people freedom and good fortune.  
Very few of these men who were arrested at that time are still alive. Those 
few are in dark prisons waiting for the coming of death to end their tortures at the 
hand of the Tupan‘s executioners. Their condition is so pitiful that their best friends 
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would not know them if they saw them, and their mothers, wives, or children would 
go mad at the sight of them.  
These helpless, unfortunate people are Uighurs, Taranchis, Kazaks, Kirghiz, 
Uzbeks, and Tatars. But they are more than representatives of the races to which we 
belong: they are our fathers, our elder brothers, our younger brothers and our 
relatives.  
Hai, people! Let all men know well:  
That these helpless, unfortunate people in the prisons of Sheng Turpan, 
drawing their last breaths of life before dying, turn upon us the eyes of their souls 
and in their moaning say to us: "For the suffering which we have endured at the 
hands of savage Chinese, you must avenge us. We are pouring forth our blood and 
yielding up our souls for our people: for this also you must avenge us." 
At the present time, in our territory of East Turkistan, all of the ruling power 
is in the hands of the Chinese alone. We are a people who have lost all human rights. 
It should be known by every man of knowledge that when the rule is in the hands of 
the Chinese, there is no equality and no justice. Only when the throats of Chinese 
fascist oppressors have been cut and they have bled to dead will we come again in to 
the life of light.  
Chinese administrators plan to move from far-away China a million Chinese 
and Chinese bandits in to our territory. Some of them, in guise of soldier and of 
refugees, have already come to Tihwa [Urumçi]; they are being dispersed among the 
several district among the several district and hsien [Xian]. It is the aim of the 
Chinese to drive us out thereafter from our native East Turkistan and to remove us by 
force to the east. This thing which the Chinese seek to do us is for us the same thing 
as the most horrible death: every one should understand this. Our bones will rot 
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unburied on either side of the long road across the Chinese steppe to far away China; 
Chinese and Chinese bandits will live in our houses, take over our goods, enjoy our 
riches, be masters in our stead; by force they will go into our wives and our 
daughters. Because of our fear and our docility and our trustfulness they will mock 
us with contemptuous laughter.  
The progressive, forward looking people among us, who give thought to our 
future welfare and fortune, have in every place organized illegal groups in order to 
fight against the savage Chinese, because the Chinese are dragging us toward a 
bottomless well, into which they mean to fling us. 
Our fighters for the people‘s freedom will unite our forces in friendship and under 
right leadership to rise against the Chinese in order to destroy that savage mastery 
and power; therefore there have been formed in every locality the illegal "National 
Freedom Groups."  
Our aim in forming the "National Freedom Groups" is to free our people 
from enslavement to the savage Chinese and thereafter to make it so that these 
people, who have been oppressed by the Chinese, strangled by them, crushed down 
by them, may arise again as national races in possession of freedom, equality before 
the law, wealth, culture, and a fortunate life.  
Our national freedom groups and all the members of the every group have 
taken an oath in the name of One God, before the souls of our heroic grandfathers 
and in the presence of all the people, to achieve, through enthusiasm and heroism, by 
legal and illegal means, by words and by force of arms, by night and by day and 
without resting the objectives set forth below.  
1. We are fighting to do away with Chinese rule in all our East Turkistan 
[Sinkiang] and to destroy for all times the root of Chinese tyranny in our territory. 
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East Turkistan belongs to the real master of the territory, the Uighur, Taranchis, the 
Kirghiz, the Kazaks, the Tatars, the Uzbek together, with all those who live among 
them in peace and friendship and who alike suffer Chinese oppression, such as the 
Mongols and other non-Chinese nations. There is no place in East Turkistan for 
Chinese colonial government or Chinese colonists.  
2. The National Freedom Groups and all of their members are fighting to 
establish in East Turkistan a real equality of rights between all races one with the 
other.  
3. We are fighting for the organization of National Political Alliance, that is, 
a Congress composed of elect representatives of the people living in East Turkistan; 
the representatives comprising this National Political Alliance should be elected in 
numbers proportionate to the total numbers of their respective races. We should 
ourselves be the real master of this National Political Alliance and not the Chinese. 
Thereafter the Chinese will have no way to deride and ill treat us: we will make our 
own lives and our own happiness according to our own desires and not according to 
those of the Chinese.  
From among the elected representatives to the National Political Alliance we 
will select the most intelligent, the most just, and those who most love the people, 
and with them we will organize our own new government.  
4. The National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting in the 
interest of the people of all races except the Chinese so that in the future the district, 
town, village and small village administrations and organizations will be composed 
of trusted, energetic, capable, just members elected according to the popular will by 
the locally resident people themselves.  
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5. The National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting for the 
cultural development of every racial nation [in Sinkiang] and for the establishment of 
lower and middle schools in their respective languages for the Children of every 
nation, these schools to be supported by the government.  
6. The National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting to 
reestablish the separate national contingents of troops, such as those comprised 
respectively by Uighurs, Kazaks, Mongols, and members of other national races, 
which where disbanded by Sheng Turpan because of his fear that they might oppose 
his political policies.  
7. Sheng Turpan running, wild, took all military and civil rule in to his own 
hands; throughout the entire East Turkistan all rule became military; in the cities 
martial law was declared, and as soon as it became evening all movement in the 
streets was absolutely forbidden; it was impossible to leave the city without 
permission. After nightfall you were prevented not only visiting your friends, but you 
could not go to see your closest relatives on the most urgent business, because the 
moment you stepped out your door, a Chinese would seize you and begin: "Where 
are you going?" "For what reason?" "What have you said?" and [he would ask you] 
many other questions. Each person was obliged to spy on everyone else and inform 
the police. At the present time East Turkistan [Sinjiang] has become one vast prison; 
the nations are captives in it and the Chinese are the executioners. The Chinese 
themselves account the situation to be on of the happiness and a fortunate life for 
natives!  
The National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting to overthrow the 
prison system set up by the oppressor, Sheng Turpan; to wrest the military and civil 
powers from the rule of one man, and to free unoffending people from captivity.  
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8. The National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting to give 
freedom to such among the number of those natives who (because of their interest in 
the welfare of the people) were arrested and imprisoned by Sheng Turpan as many 
yet to be still alive and still suffering from the Chinese oppression; these persons are 
the most trusted of our people, possess naturally the most authority, are the foremost 
among us and most dear to us.  
9. There previously existed friendly trading relations between the people of 
East Turkistan [Sinjiang] and Soviet Government; this relationship was disrupted by 
the Chinese administrations; this cessation of trade worked great hardship in our 
lives, checked the growth of peasant holdings in the villages, and brought to a 
standstill the trading in the bazaars; for each family the daily life hood became 
difficult. In every locality those who were starving, who were without clothing, who 
could not find employment, and those conditions were all together piteous, became 
more and more numerous. Big merchants became small; the small became bankrupt; 
the bankrupt became beggars. For skilled workers also there are no jobs because 
there is no one who needs to employ them. As a result they too have fallen into dire 
poverty. The number of people who have met this kind of misfortune mounts up 
higher every day. In the market there are no buyers for cattle, for the various kinds of 
wool, skins, or grains, or for the other products of the small village holdings, nor for 
the production of the cattle raisers. The powerful Sovsintorg, a large purchase, went 
out and away from East Turkistan [Sinjiang] as a consequence of the inside-out 
political policies of Sheng Turpan. The price of the food supplies and other products 
of the village holdings and of cattle and sheep husbandry are too cheap: the 
husbandman cannot buy any of the things he needs for his family‘s livelihood with 
the money he realizes from the sale of his products. From this money the Chinese 
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authorities also forcibly take all kinds of taxes and exactions, for which reason no 
one can spend for his own needs or as he likes in a carefree way the money he 
receives. The life of the peasants, of the cattle and sheep herder, of the whole 
generality of the population, thus becomes progressively more difficult day by day. 
The people of East Turkistan [Sinjiang] are like an orphaned child, without father or 
mother or any one heeds his cries. The savage Chinese have torn the child from his 
mother that bore it (the Soviet Government) and seek to give it to the foster mother 
(the Three Peoples Principles) for the latter to trample it under foot. For the people of 
East Turkistan the severance of their mutually friendly relations with the Soviet 
Union and their subjection to the discipline of the Three People‘s Principles by the 
savage Chinese is the same thing as death by torture.  
The National Freedom Group must fight to free all people from the claws of 
death by hunger, to establish anew strong and truly sincere relations of friendship 
with our great, freedom-loving friend and neighbor, the Soviet Union, and to develop 
wide and full trading relations between all our trading men and the Sovsintorg. We 
are to do away with fixed market prices set by the Chinese by proclamation and to 
destroy the other systems of regulations harmful to the people.  
10. The National Freedom Group must fight to procure the abatement and 
lightening of the unbearable load of taxes and exactions imposed upon the people by 
the Chinese. We demand of the Chinese that they decrease the endless and growing 
number of police and soldiers.  
11. The National Freedom Group must fight to secure the freedom of 
religion and will oppose all restrains placed upon religious practices.
 
12. The National Freedom Group must offer strong and merciless opposition 
to the policy of moving Chinese and Chinese bandits in to our East Turkistan and of 
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driving us, the people of the place, by force from our native soil to the East.  
Even if the Chinese, with false and sweet words, attempt to receive us, we will not 
move anywhere at all from our own soil, nor shall the Chinese enter into our land , 
because we know very well that for us these things would be the same as death. 
13. The National Freedom Groups must fight to procure the increase and 
expansion of irrigated lands, rivers, and (artificial) waterways and must direct the 
attention of our new government to such useful projects and assist(in their 
realization).  
14. The National Freedom Groups must oppose all of the many kinds of 
heavy and difficult forced labor imposed on the native peoples by the Chinese(such 
as the digging of completely useless trenches and so forth) because these things are 
no benefit to the people and are necessary to no one.  
The oppression of the savage Chinese has turned into Fascist rapacity; for 
this it is not possible to sit with quiet and patience, only watching. Every one must 
know that the time has come when he must choose one of two lives: to live a really 
happy life in freedom, or to be crushed in slavery beneath the boot of savage Chinese.  
The National Freedom Group and their members give to all people this 
warning: If because of our fear we improvidently let this moment pass, the Chinese 
will bring into our land million of Chinese bandits and they will be settled among us. 
Then we shall be strangled, robbed of all our belongings, and humiliated; then we 
shall be powerless to liberate ourselves from the claws of the Chinese Fascists.  
The National Freedom Group clearly understand this situation and we have 
sworn an oath not to permit a single moment to pass unused from this time forward, 
but rather to start now to fight against the rule of savage the Chinese oppressors, for 
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the sake of a bright life for the people, their freedom, their fortune, and their 
wellbeing.  
We call upon every man who takes thought for the happiness of his own 
family and of his people, upon all men of learning, of justice and courage, upon our 
heroes and all our youth, upon our brave soldiers, each and every one of them, not to 
let a single moment pass, to stand in our ranks as one of us to resist with us the 
oppressor Chinese. There is no single person who could possibly doubt that the help 
of the one God is on our side and his kindness is with us.  
Brothers! Each of us must rise with the heroic bravery against the Chinese. 
Our lives and our happiness are for this moment in our hands: If we are afraid we 
will lose them both.  
Enroll yourself as a member of the National Freedom Group! Organize in 
every separate place a local National Freedom Group! Let all people arise and resist 
the savage Chinese! The time of our triumph will certainly come!  
 
The National Freedom Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of Strategic Services File XL 32642. 
―Rebel Objective in Sinkiang,‖ September 25, 1945, enclosure no. 1 to dispatch no. 
23, from the American Consulate in Urumçi. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 “Struggle for the Motherland” 
(Later Rebel Pamphlet of 1944-1949) 
 
 
 
Originally East Turkistan, our Motherland, was the real territory of the 
Turkish race. We consist of seven million people. This land is our birthright left by 
our brave ancestors and it is our duty and responsibility to guard their heritage. The 
Chinese oppressor and usurpers came to this land two hundred years ago, like savage 
and bandits, seizing our territory, enslaving us, making our land a colony and 
dishonoring our holly religion. In brief, we became like men who have eyes but are 
blind, ears but are deaf, tongues but are dumb, and legs but are lame. Such treachery 
and barbarous treatment. How can they be endured? ponder over these things. Which 
of them can be gain said? If you are not a spy or a quisling; if you are born of your 
mother; if the blood from your umbilical cord wet this soil; if your father owns you 
as his legitimate son then you cannot deny the truth of what has just been said!  
You must not forget how our country flourished of old under the leadership 
of such heroes of our race as Sultan Sokushbora Khan, Harun Khan, Abdul Raschid 
Khan, Mohamet Khan, Sudduk Khan, and Osman Khan. During the times of these 
great men we were master of our territory and maintained the luster of our culture 
equal to any others. Within the last two hundred years we have lost our bright-right 
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and live like animals under the cruel sway of the Chinese who are filthy and 
barbarous.  
Why did the Ġli uprising occur? It was because we have the right to rise up 
against oppression for the sake of our liberty, the happiness and prosperity of our 
sons, and the renaissance of our religion. We also believe that the Allah has said to 
us, "I shall punish all oppressors." We also are fully convinced that the power of the 
masses is the power of Allah. In this faith we fought and over-throwing the 
treacherous Chinese sovereignty in the thee districts established a free Muslim East 
Turkistan State. At the same time we raised the flag that was handed down from our 
forefathers.  
Ho, fellow countrymen, Men of the faith and members of the same blood. 
Fear not. Strengthen your hearts and courage and consciences.  
After an abundance of bloodshed we won a compromise peace which 
consisted of eleven articles of agreement. In order to preserve this agreement in full, 
the people must be willing to sacrifice everything.  
The crafty foxes, with their swinish snouts, seeking to obtain what is not 
theirs, the shameless and oppressive Chinese, using these eleven article as a blind, 
are seeking again to trap us in their net. The cunning Chinese serve us with a wooden 
plate (which can be used once only and then must be thrown away). "May Allah 
protect us from falling once more into the Chinese hands." If we do so again the 
people know how they will be treated. People, you must remember the past. The land 
is ours and invaders have no claim to it.  
Now, the military heads of these oppressors at Urumchi are trying to prolong 
their already exhausted life. Their aim to reestablish their old barbarous methods. 
Together with them are a few running dogs, conscienceless fools and sycophants, 
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playing a quisling role with the Chinese. The eleven articles of the agreement will 
not allow the oppressors any road to regain their former suzerainty if its terms are 
fulfilled.  
Ho, shameless beasts and devils. You must know that you are already caught 
in Hell. We, people of the same blood, must not let you quislings dance to the 
Chinese music.  
The present is an era of democracy, justice, and liberty–no longer of absolute 
dictatorship. This is no more a time for slumber but a brightening period of the 
Twentieth Century.
 
We must struggle unceasingly with our belts still tightened. 
Let these oppressors depart quickly from our East Turkistan.  
Let these spies, traitors and puppets also leave at once.  
Let these running dogs of the Chinese and their coterie get out also.  
Long live free East Turkistan.  
Long live our Muslim Republican Government.  
Long live the great, the heroic warriors. Long live the crescent calling for 
our thirty days of holly fast.  
Long live the star calling for our five daily prayers.  
Away with, away with, away with these oppressors, these spies, these pro-
Chinese.  
If you do not depart there is no room for you above the ground.  
 
The Bubbling Spring  
 
Source: U.S. Department of State, Division of Chinese Affairs, ―Signs of Unrest in 
Tihwa,‖ American Consul J. Hall Paxton to the Secretary of State, Urumçi, January 
13, 1947, enclosure no. 2. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Main Figures’ Fotographs in Historical Background of the Uyghur 
Secessionism  
 
 
 
Yakub Beg                 Zuo Zongtang             Yang Zengxin              Jin Shuren 
                         
Osman Batur            Ahmetcan Kasimî           Alihan Töre                Sheng Shicai 
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Hoca Niyaz              Ma Chung-ying       Muhammad Emin Buğra      Ġsa Yusuf Alptekin 
                            
Sun Yat-sen             Chiang Kai-shek            Mao Zedong            Deng Xiaoping  
 
                                 
 Erkin Alptekin             Rebiya Kadeer             Ġsmail Cengiz             Dolkun Ġsa 
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APPENDIX B 
 
FLAGS OF EASTERN TURKISTAN 
 
 
Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan 
 
Eastern Turkistan Republic 
 
Eastern Turkistan Government in Exile 
 
 
 
 
 116 
 
 
APPENDIX G 
 
Eastern Turkistan Regulations on the Management of Religious Affairs (2001) 
(Adopted by the Chiarman’s Committee of Xinjiang People’s Regional 
Congress on July 16, 1994; amended July 16, 2001) 
 
Article 1 (new) These regulations are formulated to protect citizens‘ freedom 
of religious belief, regulate religious activities according to law, strengthen the 
management of religious affairs, and guide religion to adapt to a socialist society. 
The regulations are drawn up in accordance with the Constitution, the relevant laws 
and statutes, and in light of the actual conditions prevailing in the autonomous region. 
Article 5 (new) Religious organizations and religious affairs must not be 
controlled by foreign religious forces. The principles of independence, acting on 
one‘s own and operating by oneself must be upheld. Self-Government, Self-
Propagation and Self-Support must be practiced. Foreign organizations and 
individuals carrying out religious activities within the Autonomous Region shall be 
administered pursuant to the ―People‘s Republic of China: Regulations on the 
Supervision of the Religious Activities of Foreigners in China.‖ Religious 
organizations and individuals from outside the Autonomous Region must also abide 
by these regulations. 
Article 7 (new) The religious affairs bureaus of people‘s governments above 
the county level together with the xiang (township) people‘s governments are 
responsible for the administration of religious affairs within their respective 
jurisdictions. The relevant departments of people‘s governments above the county 
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level should, in accordance with their own responsibilities, work together with the 
religious affairs bureaus, so as to manage religious affairs successfully. The Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps should, in accordance with these regulations, 
assume responsibility for handling religious affairs within its jurisdiction. 
Article 11 (new) Religious seminaries and schools and scripture (bible) 
classes approved by the people‘s government should strengthen the training of 
patriotic religious personnel. No organization or individual may operate religious 
seminaries, schools or scripture (bible) classes without approval. Clergy may, in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the autonomous region and with approval 
(by the relevant authority), teach scripture students, and train young patriotic clergy. 
No organization or individual may secretly teach scripture students without approval. 
Article 12 (new) Clergy enjoy the following rights and privileges. They may: 
(1) engage in religious and church (mosque) activities according to law; 
(2) participate in the management of the place for religious activities where he or 
she belongs; 
(3) receive religious education, engage in religious academic research and exchange. 
Article 13 (new) Clergy shoulder the following responsibilities. They must: 
(1) love the country and the faith, abide by the laws and statutes of the state; 
(2) accept the supervision of the religious affairs bureaus of the people‘s government, 
the religious organization(s), and the democratic management organization of the 
places for religious activities. 
(3) protect the buildings, cultural objects, facilities and the environment of the places 
for religious activities. 
Article 15 (new) Religious activities must not interfere with social order, 
production order, or work or life order. 
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Article 16 (new) Religious activities must be carried out according to the on-
the-spot principle. No organized mass religious activity which spans different 
localities is allowed. Clergy is not allowed to administer religious activities in 
different localities. Missionary work in any form by non-clergy personnel is 
prohibited. 
Article 17 (new) Pilgrimage activities are to be organized by the religious 
affairs bureaus of the people‘s government and religious organizations. No other 
organization or individual may organize such activities. 
Article 23 (new) (2) Members of the democratic management organization of 
a place for religious activities are democratically elected from among the citizen 
believers and the clergy who belong to the place for religious activities, under the 
guidance of the local religious organization. 
Article 24 (new) The democratic management organization of a place for 
religious activities may operate economic entities for the purpose of self-support. It 
may sell religious objects, religious art and legally published religious literature on 
the premises of the place for religious activities. No organization or individual is 
allowed to sell illegal religious publications or illegally imported religious 
publications. Distribution of religious leaflets or religious publications that have not 
been approved by the relevant department of the people‘s government is prohibited 
everywhere. 
 
 
 
Article 27 (new) Religious organizations enjoy the following rights: 
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(1) protection of the rights and interests of citizen believers, the clergy and the places 
for religious activities, guidance and supervision of the operation of the places for 
religious activities; 
(2) confirmation and supervision of clergy and other personnel; 
(3) enjoyment of the ownership and the right to use their buildings and other property 
according to law; independently dispose of their economic income; 
(4) management of economic entities for self-support. 
Article 28 (new) A religious organization must perform the following duties: 
(1) abide by the laws and statutes of the state, accept control and supervision by the 
religious affairs bureaus and other relevant departments of people‘s governments at 
various levels; 
(2) propagate and carry out the policy of freedom of religious belief; 
(3) reflect the aspirations and demands of citizen believers; 
(4) educate citizen believers in patriotism, law-abiding and living in harmony; 
(5) engage in training activities to enhance the capabilities of the clergy; 
(6) assist the religious affairs bureaus of people‘s governments in successfully 
managing religious affairs; 
(7) guide citizen believers to participate in building socialist modernization. 
Article 32 (new) Bringing in religious publications or other religious objects 
from abroad is regulated by the relevant rules of the state and the autonomous region. 
Religious publications containing substance that endangers the state security of the 
People‘s Republic of China or the public interest of society may not be brought into 
the country. Religious publications or other religious objects illegally carried into the 
country from abroad discovered by public security, frontier defense or customs must 
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be documented and handed over to the religious affairs bureau of the local people‘s 
government for investigation and disposal. 
Article 36 (new) Personnel of government organs, who in the course of 
managing religious affairs, are found to have neglected their duty, abused power, or 
engaged in malpractice for personal gain shall be administratively punished within 
his unit or by the department overseeing said unit; where the misconduct constitutes 
a criminal offense, the offender shall bear criminal liability. 
Article 37 (new) Law-enforcement officers from religious affairs bureaus of 
the people‘s government must show their credentials when performing their official 
duties. The relevant executive department must not punish the same violation twice 
for the same reason. Those who violate these regulations and are given 
administrative penalty must be issued a copy of the administrative penalty decision. 
In cases of fines and confiscations, bills printed by the finance department of the 
autonomous region must be issued, and the money turned over to the treasury 
according to stipulated procedures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ―Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang,‖ Human 
Rights Watch, Vol. 17, No. 2(C), p.84.  
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/ (accessed April 12, 2008). 
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APPENDIX H 
 
The Constitution of Government-in-Exile of  
East Turkistan Republic 
(Adopted by the members of parliament that convened in Washington on 21st of 
November, 2004, and was announced on 22nd of November, 2004 at the 
National Press Club in Washington, DC) 
 
 
Part One 
 
The Name, Size, Character, Flag, National Emblem, National Anthem, National 
Motto, National Music, Pledge of Allegiance, Official Language, Religion, 
Capital City, and Political Party of the State. 
 
Article 1 The name of the state is East Turkistan Republic. The size of the 
state is 1,828,418 square kilometers. 
Article 2 The People and Character of the state: The people of East Turkistan 
consisted of Turkic people including Uyghurs, Qazaqs, Qirghiz, and Farsi speaking 
Tajiks and Monguls who have adopted Turkic culture throughout history. All 
intentional or unintentional acts which provoke disunity among these indigenous 
people of East Turkistan are prohibited. This is because these types of acts are 
considered to be a contribution to the ―Divide and Rule‖ policy of the enemy-the 
Chinese that has applied against the people of East Turkistan. The state-East 
Turkistan which belongs to these Turkic people may not be divided under any 
circumstances, accordingly. The character of the state is a democratic, unified and 
fully legal state that respects all human rights. 
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Article 3 The Flag of East Turkistan is Blue Flag with a Crescent moon and 
Star. The blue represents the sky whilst the crescent moon and star represent Islam. 
The States prohibits the import or export of any goods or technologies in any of the 
following circumstances. 
Article 4 The National Emblem of the State is a feature that includes nine 
points on both the right and left sites of the Crescent moon with the ―Bismillahir 
Rahmanir Rahim‖ in Arabic (In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate Source of all 
Mercy) Formula inscribed in the middle of the Crescent. The three stars above the 
mouth of the Crescent, with a cordon joining the points there below. The eighteen 
points represents the eighteen Turk clans living in East Turkistan, while the three 
stars symbolize the States of Kokturk, Uyghurs and Qarakhanids that were 
previously founded in East Turkistan. 
The National Song and Music of East Turkistan are the ―Uyghur Twelve 
Muqam‖ and other Folk Music of East Turkistan. The Independence Song of East 
Turkistan is ―Shadiyane.‖ 
Article 5 The National Anthem of the State is the following poem entitled 
―Qurtulush Yolida Sudek Aqti Bizning Qanimiz (Our Blood Has Run as a River on 
the Way of Salvation), which was written in 1933 by Memtil Ependi Tokhtaji 
Tewpiq‖.[Known as the most talented educator and a charismatic leader of the ―Jedid 
(Reform) Movement‖ in East Turkistan in the 30‘s of twentieth century, Memtil 
Ependi called the people of East Turkistan to stand up to fight the Chinese rule of 
East Turkistan. Memtil Ependi was killed in 1937 at the age of 36 along with his 
thousands of followers by the Chinese.‖] 
National Music is the ―Uyghur on Ikki Muqami (Uyghur Twelve Muqam)‖ 
and other Folk Music including the ―Shadiyane‖ played in all types of National 
Festivities or National Holidays. 
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The Pledge of Allegiance is the following poem written Abdul Eziz Mehsum 
Abdul Qadir. [Devoted his entire life (1901-1982) for the cause of independence of 
East Turkistan and spend half a century in the Chinese prison cell. Abdul Eziz 
Mehsum has been recognized by the people of East Turkistan as the determined 
unshakable symbol of challenging the Chinese authority in East Turkistan.] 
Article 6 The Official Language of the state is Uyghur. Qazaq and Qirghiz 
are used as national languages. The Religion is Islam. The State respects and protects 
other religions and fully guarantees the rights of practice of other religions. The 
Capital city of the State is Urumchi. The National Festivities or the National 
Holidays of East Turkistan are Nowruz, Ramadan, and Qurban Heyt (Sacrifying 
Festival). 
The National Day of East Turkistan is November 12. [It is the Independence 
Day of the two East Turkistan Republics established in 1933 in KaĢgar and in 1944 
in Ghulja.] 
The Memorial Day is August 27. [This date is set to commemorate the 
martyrs--the leaders of the East Turkistan Republic who were announced death after 
the so called ―Plane Crash Incident‖ reportedly occurred on August 27, 1949, after 
the plane took off for Beijing.] 
The October 1
st
 which was set as the Independence Day for Communist 
China on 1949 will be remembered as the National Grieving Day for the people of 
East Turkistan till East Turkistan attains its independence. 
The Political Party of the State is the ―National Party.‖ However, till East 
Turkistan attains its independence, the Government-In-Exile will be run under the 
leadership of the ―East Turkistan National Liberation Party.‖ All citizens of East 
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Turkistan who recognize and defend this Constitution of East Turkistan are 
considered to be the member of these parties. 
Article 7: The foregoing Articles—Article 1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 5, and 6 may not be 
changed by any means, nor can any proposal be set forth or attempt made for the 
amendment thereof. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Official Websites of the Eastern Turkistan Government in Exile. 
http://www.eastturkistangovernmentinexile.us/etr_archive.html 
(accessed in January3, 2008). 
